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Abstract
The DOORS framework is a versatile, lightweight message-based framework developed in
ANSI C++. It builds upon research experience and subsequent knowledge garnered from
the use and development of CVOPS and OVOPS, two well known protocol development
frameworks that have obtained widespread acceptance and use in both the Finnish industry
and academia. It conceptually resides between the operating system and the application,
and provides a uniform development environment shielding the developer from operating
system specific issues. It can be used for developing network services, ranging from simple
socket-based systems, to protocol implementations, to CORBA-based applications and
object-based gateways.
Originally, DOORS was conceived as a natural extension from the OVOPS framework to
support generic event-based, distributed and client-server network applications. However,
DOORS since then has evolved as a platform-level middleware solution for researching the
provision of converged services to both packet-based and telecommunications networks,
enterprise-level integration and interoperability in future networks, as well as studying
application development, multi-casting and service discovery protocols in heterogeneous
IPv6 networks.
In this thesis, two aspects of development work with DOORS take place. The first is
the investigation of the Network Address Translation (NAT) traversal problem to give
support to applications in the DOORS framework that are residing in private IP networks
to interwork with those in public IP networks. For this matter this first part focuses on
the development of a client in the DOORS framework for the Session Traversal Utilities
for NAT (STUN) protocol, to be used for IP communications behind a NAT. The second
v
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aspect involves secure communications. Application protocols in communication networks
are easily intercepted and need security in various layers. For this matter the second part
focuses on the investigation and development of a technique in the DOORS framework
to support the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, giving the ability to application
protocols to rely on secure transport layer services.
Keywords: DOORS, framework, NAT, NAT traversal, STUN, security, secure
communications, SSL, TLS.
Resumo
DOORS e´ um framework versa´til e baseado em mensagens que foi desenvolvido em C++.
E´ fruto da experieˆncia de investigac¸a˜o e conhecimento obtida pelas plataformas de de-
senvolvimento CVOPS e OVOPS. Estas plataformas teˆm sido bastante aceites tanto na
indu´stria como no campo de investigac¸a˜o Finlandesa. O DOORS reside entre o sistema
operativo e a aplicac¸a˜o, fornecendo um ambiente de desenvolvimento uniforme protegendo
o programador de questo˜es espec´ıficas do sistema operativo. Pode ser usado tanto para o
desenvolvimento de servic¸os de rede, que va˜o desde sistemas simples com sockets, imple-
mentac¸a˜o de protocolos, como para aplicac¸o˜es baseadas em CORBA e gateways baseados
em objectos.
Originalmente o DOORS foi concebido como uma extensa˜o natural da plataforma OVOPS
para suportar aplicac¸o˜es de redes gene´ricas baseadas em eventos, distribu´ıdas e cliente-
servidor. No entanto, desde enta˜o, o DOORS tem evolu´ıdo como uma soluc¸a˜o de mid-
dleware para investigar a prestac¸a˜o de servic¸os convergentes para as redes de pacotes e
de telecomunicac¸o˜es, para a integrac¸a˜o a n´ıvel empresarial e de interoperabilidade em re-
des futuras. Tambe´m se pretende que sirva para estudar o desenvolvimento de aplicac¸o˜es
multi-casting e protocolos de descoberta de servic¸os em redes heteroge´neas IPv6.
Esta tese cobre dois aspectos de desenvolvimento no framework DOORS. O primeiro e´ a
investigac¸a˜o do problema da penetrac¸a˜o em routers Network Address Translation (NAT),
de modo a dar-se suporte a`s aplicac¸o˜es de redes IP privadas (para que possam interagir
com as redes IP pu´blicas). Para tal, desenvolveu-se um cliente no framework DOORS que
suporta o protocolo Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN), que pode ser utilizado
para comunicac¸o˜es IP com ma´quinas protegidas por um NAT. O segundo aspecto envolve
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comunicac¸o˜es seguras. Protocolos de aplicac¸a˜o em redes de comunicac¸a˜o sa˜o facilmente
interceptados e precisam de seguranc¸a em va´rias camadas. Nesta segunda parte investigou-
se e desenvolveu-se uma te´cnica para suportar o protocolo Transport Layer Security (TLS)
no framework DOORS, permitindo que os protocolos de aplicac¸a˜o usem seguranc¸a na
camada de transporte.
Palavras-chave: DOORS, framework, NAT, penetrac¸a˜o em NATs, STUN, segu-
ranc¸a, comunicac¸o˜es seguras, SSL, TLS.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Problem Statement and Motivation
The rapid development of computers and communications technology is allowing more and
more devices to interact with each other. One of the most profound changes today is the
increase in mobility of portable yet powerful wireless devices capable of communicating via
several different kinds of wireless radio networks of varying link-level characteristics. Such
wireless networks include 802.11-based Wi-Fi Local Area Networks (LANs), Wideband
Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA) cellular networks, and Bluetooth or Infrared
based short range communications. Low-power energy efficient radio networks such as
ZigBee are widely expected to play dominant roles in the medium to long-term future
wireless mobility.
Accordingly to Silverajan [1], such increase of mobile networks raises the importance of
taking into account the resilience and sustainability of the Internet of the future, and give
special effort on the way applications and protocols today are being designed. Designing
applications and protocols in the future requires a clean layered design while raising the
level of abstraction to represent multiple applications in a device, multiple devices for a
user and multiple users in a network.
Taking into account these needs, Distributed Object OpeRationS (DOORS) [2] is presented
as a highly interoperable and lightweight event-based framework capable of serving these
1
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needs while modelling, monitoring and handling events intrinsically present in commu-
nication architectures. Technically, DOORS is a C++ network programming framework
developed for implementing protocols and network applications. The framework can also
be used for developing network services, ranging from simple socket-based systems, to dis-
tributed applications, object-based gateways as well as general event-based client-server
applications.
Therefore, developing protocols at the network and application layers must also be consid-
ered. In this thesis, two different aspects are discussed. The first is the investigation of the
Network Address Translation (NAT) traversal problem to give support to applications in
the DOORS framework that are residing in private IP networks to interwork with others
in public IP networks. For this matter this first part focuses on developing client support
in the DOORS framework for the Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) [3] proto-
col, to be used for IP communications behind a NAT. The second aspect involves secure
communications. Application protocols in communication networks are easily intercepted
and might need security in various layers. For this matter the second part focuses on the
investigation and development of a technique in the DOORS framework to support the
Transport Layer Security (TLS) [4] protocol, giving the ability to application protocols to
rely on secure transport layer services.
1.2 Objectives and Contributions
This thesis focuses on two different aspects, both important for developing protocols in
the DOORS framework.
The first aspect focuses on NAT traversal solutions. The presented solution is the imple-
mentation of the STUN protocol in the DOORS framework, a tool to be used for other
protocols in the context of NAT traversal solutions.
The second aspect focuses on security in the network. Many applications interworking in
a public network might need a security layer in order to ensure a secure communication.
The goal is to study the vulnerabilities in a network (especially in the Transport Layer),
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and give support to applications in the DOORS framework that need to ensure secure
transactions. The presented solution is the integration of the TLS protocol in the DOORS
framework, a protocol to be combined with other application protocols that might need
to provide communication security over the Internet.
The main contributions of this dissertation are the implementations themselves, that are
fully integrated in the DOORS framework and can be used in the future by other devel-
opers. The proposed models are meant to be easy to use and to be integrated with other
protocols. The implementations are tested in order to study their operation and their
interoperability.
1.3 Thesis Outline
The thesis is structured in seven chapters, including the introduction and the conclusions
chapter.
Chapter 2 introduces a brief state-of-the-art description of the DOORS framework. It
presents its architecture and some of its functionalities.
Chapter 3 introduces a brief state-of-the-art description for NAT. It presents the usage of
NAT and the problems of its usage. Later on, it presents a useful protocol (STUN), a tool
to provide NAT traversal solutions.
Chapter 4 introduces a brief state-of-the-art description for Security in the Network. It
starts by presenting the most typical problems in different layers of a network, and later
on presents useful solutions to provide security. Lastly, it presents the TLS protocol, that
combines all the algorithms explained before to provide a sense of security for the problems
described before.
Chapter 5 adds some considerations and introduces the design of models and the imple-
mentation for the following two protocols: STUN and TLS.
Chapter 6 shows the results and presents the analysis and validation of the proposed
models.
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Finally, chapter 7 presents the final conclusions and remarks of this thesis, as well as some
future work perspectives.
Appendix A presents some technical information for the STUN implementation, and Ap-
pendix B presents technical information for the TLS implementation.
Chapter 2
The DOORS Framework
2.1 Introduction
Distributed Object OpeRationS (DOORS) [1] is an object-based software framework for
designing distributed systems in heterogeneous network environments, especially on the
Internet. It is a C++ network programming framework developed for implementing proto-
cols and network applications. It gives the possibility to the programmer to write callback
functions and invoke them by the event handlers. Besides, the framework gives a platform
to the programmer and all the user events are mapped into DOORS messages. In terms
of portability, DOORS is both portable and lightweight. The developer is not hindered
from exercising any of the advanced C++ language-level features such as templates and
exception handling, nor is prevented from using other frameworks and other libraries as
part of the developed application. The DOORS is a single-threaded framework that can
be compiled and used in the most of UNIX and Linux variants [5].
2.2 Requirements
Since DOORS is written in American National Standards Institute (ANSI) C++ language,
first it requires an ANSI-compliant compiler supporting features of the language includ-
ing Standard Template Library (STL), namespaces and template programming. Usually,
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development platforms such as Solaris, FreeBSD, OpenBSD and Linux use GNU C++
compiler version 2.95.2 or later. Sun C++ compiler version 5 and later are used on Solaris
version 8 and 9 operating systems.
The operating system must also support many functions that are typically used in UNIX
systems such as pipe(), select(), malloc() and socket(). It must also support UNIX style
tty devices.
DOORS makes use of GNU autoconf and automake to determine the current compilation
environment in use. They are used during the build phase to create and configure a UNIX
shell script which is then included in the released versions of DOORS and used in the
target system to make several tests on the system. These tests consist of checking if the
required C or C++ header files are available, compiling various C source files to discover
characteristics of the compiler in use and to verify that the required external libraries exist
in the system. After a successful check, the configure script creates Makefile files that are
used by make command to build the DOORS system by calling the compiler with each
source file and finally linking them to one library or an executable application [6].
2.3 Framework Architecture
The DOORS framework is an extensible object-oriented framework for network enabled
application development. It is not just a set of libraries which can be utilised to implement
interconnectivity, but also a complete application development environment featuring ad-
vanced Scheduling, I/O Handling, and automatic code generation.
DOORS conceptually resides between the operating system (Unix based) and the applica-
tion developed by the programmer. The developer is shielded from the operation system
specific issues and is provided a uniform development environment. All the user events are
mapped into DOORS messages. When a developer wants to implement an application,
DOORS reduces this event-driven application into a set of interacting Tasks, Ports and
DOORS Messages. Tasks communicate with each other using Ports and passing messages
through the connected Ports. Each Message passed to the Task such as user input, incom-
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ing protocol packet or time-outs represents a event. The result of any application and its
interaction with DOORS is largely asynchronous and message-based. Figure 2.1 depicts
how the various modules, subsystems and tools of the framework, together with the ma-
chine’s operating system and external libraries, can be architecturally represented.
Operating System (*nix-based)
Protocol ToolBox 
Movement Detection
Module 
Memory Management
Module
Event-monitoring 
Subsystem
Protocols Store
RTP/RTCP SLPGIOP
TCPmuxUDP SAP
Asynchronous 
CORBA Subsystem
Code Generators
Utilities
Module
Task Scheduling Subsystem
Scheduler
Tasks
Timer 
Manager
I/O Handling Subsystem
I/O Handler
virtual
devices
External 
LibrariesExternal 
LibrariesExternal 
Libraries
Applications
Host
Inspector 
Figure 2.1: DOORS architecture1
The Protocols Store contains several existing protocols already implemented, and can be
directly used by the developer to accompany new applications, such as UDP, TCPmux,
RTP and SLP.
The Protocol Toolbox contains specialized Protocol Tasks for aiding protocol develop-
ment, finite state machine implementations, Service Access Points, and encoding/decod-
ing of Protocol Data Units, bi-directional Ports used by Tasks for message passing and
multiplexers that allow M:N communications between Tasks.
The Event-monitoring Subsystem consists of tools used at runtime to monitor various parts
of a running system such as the state of tasks, internal variables, the number of messages
processed, their types, timers as well as the scheduler load. The Subsystem contains a local
event monitor capable of inspecting intra-process events in a locally running application, a
distributed event monitor capable of inspecting events simultaneously in multiple DOORS
based applications running in a network, tools for logging events into files as well as
1Reprinted from Silverajan et. al [1]
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a hierarchically organized symbol handling interface through which the event monitors
communicate with the application.
In addition, the Utilities and Memory Management Modules provide basic support for
implementation and runtime memory management. The Utilities Module offers basic
datatypes, structures and class templates. Frame and cell classes provide flexible ways
in storing and manipulating large octet arrays. The Memory Management Module of-
fers advanced memory management featuring basic, statistical and block memory alloca-
tions.
Event-basedClient Apps
Event-basedServer Apps
Timer Tasks
I/O Handler
ProtocolTasks
CORBAClient Apps
CORBAServer Apps
Scheduler
CORBA Subsystem
DII
DSI
POA
ORB/IIOP
External World
Timer devices
File devices
UNIX ttydevices
UNIX pipedevices
Userimplementeddevices
Socket devices
Figure 2.2: DOORS communication model2
Consequently, using this architecture it is possible to develop systems using DOORS to
communicate at multiple levels simultaneously, possessing the capacity of harnessing inter-
process communication, virtual devices, protocols and the asynchronous CORBA system
to interact with many types of external programs. Figure 2.2 illustrates the communication
model of DOORS [5]. A DOORS-process runs in a single UNIX-process with its own
scheduler and tasks that are controlled by a scheduler. A DOORS-process is a collection
of DOORS tasks and a scheduler running on one UNIX-process. A DOORS application
refers to a distributed application that may contain more than one DOORS-processes in
communication to each other. Some interesting modules of these subsystems and their
2Reprinted from Karvinen [6]
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connections are described in detail in the following subsections.
DOORS contains several libraries and applications. Figure 2.3 shows the inheritance of
some of the C++ base classes in DOORS. A task in DOORS is an object that is represented
by the Otask base class and its derivations. Otask defines an abstract method run() which
is inherited and implemented by its descendants. That function is called by a scheduler
for execution of the task’s own routines. Address is a base class for all the address type
classes in DOORS. It is just shown in the figure as an example of DOORS types. It is
specialised to InetAddr which is an address handler for Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4)
addresses and InetAddr6 for Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) [6].
Otask
+run()
EventTask
+messageQueue: LinkList*
PTask
+sm: StateMachine*
RTTask
Address
InetAddrInetAddr6
Port
+other: Port*
Iface
IoHandler
+inform(Device*)+forget(Device*)
ClientTask
Message
+sender: Port*+target: Port*
Scheduler
+ioHandler: IoHandler*+timerTask: TimerTask*
+inform(Otask*)+forget(Otask*)
TimerTask
+timers: TimerList
Device
+callbackWrite(): void+callbackRead(): void
1
*
Figure 2.3: Examples of some of the DOORS classes3
2.3.1 Scheduler
The Scheduler is part of the Scheduling subsystem and is a task which is derived from Otask
but it is specialised in allocating execution turns to other tasks. Various tasks might have
calls to execute at the same time. In order to execute them in DOORS, a Task needs to
ask for a execution turn to the Scheduler. In a typical DOORS application, it is called in a
loop from the main() function. The Scheduler class is an implementation of Round-Robin
3Reprinted from Karvinen [6]
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Scheduler and it is currently the only scheduler algorithm available within DOORS. The
Scheduler maintains a list of the tasks that are being scheduled. The methods inform()
and forget() are used to add a task for scheduling and to remove it, respectively [6].
2.3.2 I/O Handler and devices
It is essential for a protocol implementation framework to provide access to the device’s
interfaces and hardware configurations, as well as to have a flexible yet efficient input/out-
put handling system. The responsibility of such service is handled by the I/O Handling
subsystem.
The I/O Handling subsystem is directly responsible for allowing event-driven tasks and
applications to communicate with external entities by introducing the concept of a Virtual
device. Such virtual devices currently include IPv4 and IPv6 network devices that perform
both unicast and multicast communication, and stream I/O facilities such as files and
pipes. Virtual devices possesses identifiers represented by file descriptors and perform
a uniform interface to tasks using functions such as open(), close(), read() and write().
However data transfer is asynchronous. Hence when writing to a device, the data is stored
in a buffer until the execution turn is obtained from the Scheduler, and a callback function
is invoked to perform the actual bytewise transmission.
Therefore, the Handling Subsystem relies on a I/O Handler. The I/O Handler is derived
from Otask and it is responsible to manage the devices required for communication. It
is responsible to obtain execution turns from the Scheduler and ensure callback routines
from the devices to handle events[1].
2.3.3 Tasks, Messages and Ports
Ports provide a way to connect DOORS Tasks to each other. It has the methods putMes-
sage() and getMessage() for putting and getting a Message object in a port for transition.
Figure 2.4 illustrates how to send a message between DOORS tasks.
In practice, the message object is instantiated from a specialised Message class. That
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specialised class contains attributes for the data being delivered through the ports. For
simplicity, this is not shown in the Figure. EventTask is derived from Task and it supports
message queues and connecting to another EventTask or its descendant via a Port.
EventTask1
run()
MessagePort1
EventTask2
run()
Port2
message queue
Scheduler
Figure 2.4: Sending and asynchronous message in DOORS4
Tasks in general communicate with each other using Ports and passing messages through
the connected Ports. The connection is established using connect() method provided by
Port. The Scheduler calls the run() method of a EventTask to make possible the execution
of each Task. PTask is a descendant of EventTask and it is specialised to tasks featuring
a finite state machine [6].
2.3.4 XML code generators
Implementing a protocol with a computer language typically follows the same pattern
of writing encoders and decoders for messages and because even the simplest protocols
feature a state machine, a programmer must also write a state machine in his protocol
implementation. Using a code generator which reads generalised representation of the
protocol messages and its state machine and creates skeleton code for the programmer to
use in his implementation speeds up the coding work.
The Code Generators are used to compile XML code parsed by the programmer. DOORS
provides three code generators:
• dpeerg : Responsible for defining Protocol Data Unit PDU’s between protocol peers;
• dsapg : Responsible for defining Service Access Point (SAP);
• dsmg : Responsible for defining finite state machines.
4Reprinted from Karvinen [6]
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XML specifications are then parsed by generators in DOORS at compile time to produce
corresponding framework specific C++ classes such as Messages, Service Access Points,
Service Primitives as well as extended finite state machines. The example of the figure 2.5
provides a rough idea of a XML specification for the Protocol Data Units (PDUs) of the
Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) in DOORS.
<Peer Name="RtpPeer">
<Message Name="DATA">
<Field> InetAddr srcIP </Field>
<Field> InetAddr destIP </Field>
<Field> Uint8 version </Field>
<Field> Uint8 padding </Field>
<Field> Uint8 extension </Field>
<Field> Uint8 csrc_count </Field>
<Field> Uint8 marker </Field>
<Field> Uint8 payload_type </Field>
<Field> Uint16 sequence_number </Field>
<Field> Uint32 timestamp </Field>
<Field> Uint32 ssrc </Field>
<Field> Frame payload </Field>
</Message>
</Peer>
Figure 2.5: PDU definiton example
2.3.5 Local Event Monitor (LEMon)
As an example on how to monitor a DOORS-process, this section describes the Local Event
Monitor (LEMon). It was originally developed for OVOPS in Lappeenranta University of
Technology as the Textual Protocol Tracer (TPT) but was renamed to follow the naming
conventions in DOORS. Initially, it was not included in DOORS but was later adopted to
DOORS because at the time there were no monitoring tools available in DOORS. LEMon
is also useful as a protocol programming teaching and debugging tool.
LEMon provides a text-based debugging environment for tracing events and also for send-
ing user-defined events to a process. The user is not required to make changes in his
code during testing but makes it possible to try various execution scenarios using the user
interface and textual representation of the messages [6].
Chapter 3
Network Address Translation
(NAT)
3.1 Introduction
Internet as a global and huge network has been growing exponentially. As millions of new
users and devices have been connecting every day, lack of Internet addresses has becoming
an increasingly demanding challenge. Traditionally, home and business customers connect
to the Internet with dial-up connections using an Internet Service Provider (ISP) that
dynamically assign Internet Protocol (IP) addresses that should be unique on the Internet.
Originally IP addresses were defined by IPv4 protocol. However, the number of addresses
provided by IPv4 is limited. That was one of the reasons why a complete redesign of the
protocol was started, known as IPv6. However, in order to respond to the shortage of
IPv4 addresses in the short-term, Network Address Translation (NAT) was proposed [7,
pp. 444–448], which is described in RFC 3022 [8].
The basic idea is to let a NAT-based router rewrite the address information in outgoing
and incoming messages. By changing the source private IP address and port number to
public ones for outgoing connection requests, NAT creates a mapping to allow the return
packets to reach the original initiator, and in this case, NAT is “transparent”to both
endpoints.
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Internet
S= 10.0.0.1, 3345
D= 207.192.75.61, 80
1
S= 138.76.29.7, 5001
D= 207.192.75.61, 80
10.0.0.4
138.76.29.7
2
S= 207.192.75.61, 80
D= 138.76.29.7, 5001
3
S= 207.192.75.61, 80
D= 138.76.29.7, 3345
4
A:
10.0.0.1
B:
10.0.0.2
C:
10.0.0.3
S:
207.192.75.61
NAT translation table
WAN side LAN side
138.76.29.7, 5001
...
10.0.0.1, 3345
...
Figure 3.1: Network address translation1
A NAT router residing at home, can be used as a gateway connection to the Internet,
having at least one network interface connected to the internal network and at least one
network interface connected to the Internet (possessing a routable IP address), in order to
connect all the machines to the Internet. Therefore, to multiple hosts in the same network,
NAT provides different private IP addresses, and a single public IP address.
Figure 3.1 is one example, and shows the operation of a NAT-enabled router. Hosts
A, B and C are in the same home network and connected to a router. The router is
a NAT-enabled router, and provides for all the computers different private IP addresses,
respectively 10.0.0.1, 10.0.0.2, 10.0.0.3, and provides a single public IP address 138.76.29.7.
Therefore, the NAT-enabled router behaves to the outside world as a single device with
single public IP address, and hides the details of the home network. This is possible due to
the fact that the NAT-enabled router maintains a NAT translation table with IP addresses
in the table entries including port numbers.
Usually the NAT-enabled routers use Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) to
provide addresses in the home network. Considering the example of the figure 3.1, the
host A: 10.0.0.1 wishes to reach Internet, and opens a browser to read the news in the
1Adapted from Ross et. al [9]
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Server S: 207.192.75.61. The host A: 10.0.0.1 assigns the (arbitrary) source port 3345
locally and sends the packet into the LAN (transaction 1). The NAT router receives the
IP packet, checks the source port and destination, and generates a new source port 5001
for the packet, creating a new entry in the NAT translation table. Then, the NAT router
replaces the source IP address and port with its WAN-side address 138.76.29.7 and the
generated source port 5001 and sends the packet into the Internet to reach the destination
server (transaction 2). The Web server completely unaware of these changes, receives the
packet and reads the source IP address and port, sending a response back to the router
(transaction 3). The NAT router gets the response, and checks its NAT translation table
to compare the destination port number 5001 of the packet to the entries in the table.
Obtained the appropriate IP address 10.0.0.1 and destination port number 3345, the NAT
router replaces the destination port and IP address and route the packet to the host A
(transaction 4) [9].
3.2 NAT Traversal
Problems arise when a peer wants to initiate a new communication with another peer
that is connected to the Internet via NAT. Without further arrangements, the NAT-based
router will deny this communication request and will drop incoming messages. Thus, the
peer is unreachable from other peers [10]. For example, services that require Transmis-
sion Control Protocol (TCP) connections initiated from outside of the NAT (public IP
addresses), or stateless protocols such as those using User Datagram Protocol (UDP), can
be disrupted and the functionality of the protocol may be compromised. Developed ser-
vices following the Peer-to-peer (P2P) paradigm such as file sharing, instant messaging
and Voice over IP (VoIP) are examples of applications that suffer from the existence of
NAT.
One possible solution for this problem is to let users configure the router manually, chang-
ing the NAT tables. However, this is very inconvenient for the user and requires admin-
istration rights. Then, to allow incoming messages to reach the peer, a so-called NAT
traversal approach is required.
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NAT traversal techniques are typically required for clients that need to start a protocol
and the communication is affected by the NAT-based routers. Since NAT behaviour is
not standardized, many techniques of NAT traversal exist, but just one can be applied
[11]. In the next section 3.3, the Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) protocol is
described as a tool to be used in the context of NAT Traversal solutions.
3.3 Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)
As explained in section 3.2, NAT traversal techniques are required for clients that need
to start a specific protocol that is affected by the NAT-based routers. In the original
specification Simple Traversal of User Datagram Protocol (UDP) through Network Address
Translators (NATs) (STUN) described in the RFC 3489 [12], sometimes called “classic
STUN”, was proposed as a complete NAT traversal technique. However, experience since
the publication of RFC 3489 has found that classic STUN simply does not work sufficiently
well to be a deployable solution. Therefore, a specification of an updated set of methods
published in RFC 5389 [3], Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) was proposed,
retaining the same acronym but with some differences. STUN is not a NAT traversal
solution by itself. Rather, just a tool to be used in the context of NAT traversal. This is
an important change from the previous specification (RFC 3489) that is now deprecated.
In the next sections, the STUN protocol is explained.
3.3.1 Protocol analysis
Many NAT traversal techniques require assistance from a computer server located in the
public Internet. Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) is a light-weight client-server
protocol that appeared as a tool to be used in the context of one or more NAT traversal
solutions. Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE) [13], Traversal Using Relay NAT
(TURN) [14], Client-Initiated Connections in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [15]
and NAT Behavior Discovery Using Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) [16] are
four defined usages of STUN at the time. Other STUN usages may be defined in the
future.
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A STUN server can be located in the public Internet in order to give useful information
to the clients behind a NAT-router and allow the private IP networks behind a NAT to
interwork with public IP networks. Therefore, the STUN server allows a client to find
out its public address/port pair that they are associated in the NAT-router. A possible
configuration is shown in the figure 3.2.
STUN
Client
STUN
Server
NAT 1 NAT 2
Private 
Network 1
Private 
Network 2 Internet
Figure 3.2: Possible STUN configuration
Typically hosts are connected to the internet through 1 or more NAT routers. In this
configuration two main entities (called STUN agents) exist, a STUN client and a STUN
server. The lower agent STUN client is connected to a private network 1. This network is
then connected to a private network 2 through NAT 1, and consequently private network
2 connects to the Internet through NAT 2. The upper agent resides in the public Internet
and it is the STUN server.
The STUN Client is the entity that starts the protocol. It sends STUN requests to the
STUN Server, and receives STUN responses. The STUN Server is the entity responsible
to give to the client the information that it requests. In this case, the Server receives the
STUN requests and sends the STUN responses.
Figure 3.3 is one example of a STUN protocol communication and shows the operation
of the STUN protocol using the configuration of the figure 3.2. The client A is in a
private network 1. This network is then connected to a private network 2 through NAT
1, and consequently connected to the Internet through NAT 2. In the STUN protocol
communication, the client A is the lower agent STUN client. The client A with private
IP address 10.0.0.1 needs to find its external IP/Port in order to send this information to
the client B. Then, it sends a STUN message (1) to the STUN server asking “What is my
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NAT 1Client A
(Private IP/Port =
10.0.0.1:6112)
NAT 2
Public IP
138.76.29.7
Client B
1
2
3
What is my public 
IP/Port?
You look like:
138.76.29.7:5001
Contact me to:
138.76.29.7:5001
NAT rewrites source to:
Public IP/Port 
138.76.29.7:5001
STUN
Server
Figure 3.3: Use STUN to find external IP/Port
public IP/Port?”. The message passes through NAT 1 and NAT 2 and reaches the STUN
server with the source IP/Port from the NAT 2 (138.76.29.7:5001). The STUN server
reads the message, writes the reflexive IP/Port in the message (2) and sends it back to the
source IP/Port that corresponds to the NAT 2. At this point NAT 2 receives the message
2 and sends it to the NAT 1, and NAT 1 sends it to the client A. Now client A knows
its own public IP/Port used to external communications and sends a message (3) to the
client B with its own information. Now the client B knows how to contact the client A,
and it can combine this information with many NAT traversal techniques to contact the
client A.
3.3.2 Protocol operation
In detail, STUN is a client-server protocol and supports two types of transactions: re-
quest/response transactions and indication transactions. Request/response transactions
are the ones in which a client sends a request to a server, and the server returns a re-
sponse. Indication transactions are the ones in which either agent client or server sends
an indication that generates no responses.
All STUN messages must start with a fixed header that includes a method, class and a
transaction ID. The transaction ID is a 96-bit randomly selected number used to identify
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each transaction, helping the client to associate the server responses to the requests gener-
ated. The class indicates the type of the message, which may be request, success response,
error response or indication. The method indicates which of the various requests or indi-
cations it refers to. Currently binding is the only method defined, but other methods are
expected to be defined in future documents. The RFC 5389 only defines a single method
binding, which is used either in request/response transactions or in indication transac-
tions. The binding method when used in request/response transactions can be used to
determine the particular “binding”a NAT has allocated to the STUN client. When used in
either request/responses or indication transactions, the binding method can also be used
to keep these “bindings”alive [3].
STUN Client NAT 1 NAT 2 STUN Server
S= 10.0.0.1:6112 
D= 75.121.23.17:3478 S= 192.168.1.2:5001 D= 75.121.23.17:3478 S= 138.76.29.7:5001 D= 75.121.23.17:3478
S= 75.121.23.17:3478
D= 138.76.29.7:5001S= 75.121.23.17:3478D= 192.168.1.2:5001S= 75.121.23.17:3478D= 10.0.0.1:6112 Reflexive Address
138.76.29.7:5001Reflexive Address138.76.29.7:5001Reflexive Address138.76.29.7:5001
1: STUN Binding Request
6: STUN Binding Response
5: STUN Binding Response
3: STUN Binding Request
4: STUN Binding Response
2: STUN Binding Request
Figure 3.4: STUN Client-Server diagram
Typically, a STUN binding request/response is based on a scheme illustrated in the figure
3.2. The agent STUN client sends a STUN binding request message to the STUN server
and it might pass through one or more NATs between the two agents. In this example
two NATs are shown. When the STUN binding request passes through each NAT, the
NAT modifies the source transport address of the packet. As a result, the source transport
address of the packet received by the STUN server corresponds to the public IP address
and port created by the closest NAT to the server. This is called transport reflexive
address. Then, the STUN server copies the source transport address and makes it an
attribute of the body for the STUN binding response packet. This response packet passes
back through the two NATs that modify the destination address of the packet, but the
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reflexive address in the body remains untouched. In this way, the client can learn its
reflexive transport address.
STUN usually operates on a User Datagram Protocol (UDP). When running a STUN over
UDP it is possible that some STUN messages are dropped by the network. Reliability
of STUN request/response can be accomplished with retransmissions by the client that
should retransmit request messages. However, UDP does not provide reliable transport
guarantees. Other way is to run STUN over Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). When
reliability is mandatory TCP may be used in order to provide a connection between the
client and the server. Besides, in order to provide security, Transport Layer Security (TLS)
may be used to accompany the TCP. For this, the STUN messages may be transported
and encrypted via TCP/TLS.
3.3.3 STUN Message Structure
As explained in chapter 1, this thesis focus is a UDP implementation of the STUN pro-
tocol. Therefore, this section focuses in the specific information to reach the required
specifications.
Typically in the Internet Protocol (IP), the messages are encoded in binary using the stan-
dard network bite order (also known as big-endian, in the sense that the most significant
byte or octet is sent first). The transmission order is described in detail in Appendix B of
RFC 791 [17].
STUN messages consist of one header field followed by data (attributes) fields. Therefore,
the STUN messages must start with the same header format. A 20-byte header followed
by zero or more attributes. Then, the STUN header contains a STUN message type,
message length, magic cookie and transaction id.
Figure 3.5 illustrates the structure of the STUN header. The most significant 2 bits must
be zeroes. This is used to differentiate the STUN messages from the messages of other
protocols. The header contains the following fields:
• STUN Message Type: A 14-bit STUN Message Type defines the message class
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00 STUN MESSAGE TYPE (14 bits) MESSAGE LENGTH (16 bits)
MAGIC COOKIE (32 bits)
TRANSACTION ID (96 bits)
Figure 3.5: Format of STUN message header
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Figure 3.6: Format of STUN Message Type field
(request, success response, error response or indication) and the message method
(this specification defines a single method, binding). Although there are four mes-
sage classes, there are only two types of transactions: request/response transactions
(which consist of a request message and a response message) and an indication
(which consists of a single indication message). Requests and indications have just
one form, although the responses are split into two forms, success messages and error
messages. The structure of the STUN Message Type is illustrated in figure 3.6. In
the message type field, the bits are order from the most significant (M11) until the
least significant (M0). The 12-bit M11 to M0 represent the encoding of the method.
The C1 and C0 represent the 2-bit encoding of the class. The class 0b00 is defined
as a request, the class 0b01 is an indication, the 0b10 is the success response, and
the 0b11 is a error response. However, this specification defines a single method,
binding, so it takes the value 0b000000000001. The bits of the method and the class
may be disposed as illustrated in figure 3.6.
• Message Length: These 16 bits must contain the size, in bytes, of the message
body (not including the 20-byte header).
• Magic Cookie: These 16 bits must contain the fixed numeric value 0x2112A442.
This field was part of the transaction ID in the older specification RFC 3489. Now is
placed in this location and it allows the server to detect if the client will understand
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certain new attributes that were added in the new specification RFC 5389.
• Transaction ID: The transaction ID is a 92-bit randomly selected number by the
initiator of the communication. It is used uniquely to identify STUN transactions.
For request/response transactions it is randomly selected by the client, and echoed
by the Server. For indications it is chosen by the agent that is sending the indication.
This field is very important. It primarily serves to correlate requests with responses,
but it also improves the security and helps to prevent certain types of attacks [3].
The details of the attributes are given in the next section.
3.3.4 STUN attributes
As explained before, the STUN messages contain a header and a data field which must
contain attributes. Each attribute must be TLV (Type-Length-Value) encoded with 16-bit
Type, 16-bit Length and a Value with variable length.
TYPE (16 bits) LENGTH (16 bits)
VALUE (variable)
Figure 3.7: Format of STUN Attributes
The format of the STUN attributes is illustrated in figure 3.7. Each attribute contains
the following three fields:
• Type: The Type field specifies the type of the attribute. It must be a hex number
in the range 0x0000 - 0xFFFF. Values between 0x0000 and 0x7FFF are compression-
required attributes, which means that these attributes have to be understandable
by the agent and cannot successfully process the message unless it understands the
attribute. Values between 0x8000 and 0xFFFF are compression-optional attributes,
which means that these attributes can be ignored by the agent if it does not under-
stand them. The most common attributes, those that will be used in this project
are: 0x0009f for Error-Code, 0x000A for Unkown-Attributes and 0x0020 for XOR-
Mapped-Address.
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• Length: The Length field is a 16-bit numeric value and must contain the length,
in bytes, of the attribute which will be posted in the Value field (not including the
32-bit Type plus Length).
• Value: The Value field must contain the attribute specified in the Type field and it
has variable length.
The next sections describe in detail the format of the most common attributes used in
this project.
XOR-Mapped-Address
The XOR-Mapped-Address attribute contains the reflexive transport address, and it is
obfuscated through the XOR function. Consequently the former (STUN server) encodes
the transport address by making a XOR operation with the Magic Cookie contained in
the header.
XXXXXXXX (8 bits) X-PORT (16 bits)
X-ADDRESS (variable)
FAMILY (8 bits)
Figure 3.8: Format of XOR-Mapped-Address Attribute
The format of the XOR-Mapped-Address attribute is illustrated in figure 3.8. The most
significant 8 bits specified in the older RFC 3489 [12] were zeroes, and the address was
defined simply as Mapped-Address and was not encoded. However, deployment experience
found that some NATs rewrite the 32-bit binary payloads (IPv4 addresses), containing
the NATs public address (Mapped-Address attribute). Such behaviour was interfering the
operation of STUN [3]. Now in the new RFC [3] the address is obfuscated through the
XOR function, which means that the most significant 8 bits must be unknown value X (do
not care) and must be ignored by the receivers. This attribute also contains the following
fields:
• Family: The Family field is an 8-bit numeric value which represents the IP address
family of the X-Address field: 0x01 for IPv4 and 0x02 for IPv6.
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• X-Port: The X-Port field is an 16-bit numeric value which represents the transport
mapped port received in the request. This field must be computed making the XOR
operation with the most significant 16 bits of the Magic Cookie.
• X-Address: The X-Address is the transport mapped address received in the re-
quest. If the IP family is IPv4, the result should be computed by taking the mapped
IP address in host byte order and making the XOR operation with the Magic Cookie
of the header. If the IP family is IPv6, the result should be computed by taking
the mapped IP address in host byte order and making the XOR operation with the
concatenation of the MAGIC COOKIE and the TRANSACTION ID of the header.
The length depends of the family, so it has a variable length.
Error-Code
The Error-Code attribute is used to identify an error response message. It usually contains
a numeric error code between 300 and 699 plus a textual reason phrase encoded in UTF-8
defined in the RFC 3629 [18] whose semantics are consistent with SIP [19] and HTTP
[20].
RESERVED, should be 0 (21 bits) NUMBER (8 bits)
REASON PHRASE (variable, maximum 763 bytes)
CLASS
(3 bits)
Figure 3.9: Format of Error-Code Attribute
The format of the Error-Code attribute is illustrated in figure 3.9. The most significant
21 bits should be zeroes and are for alignment on 32-bit boundaries and receivers must
ignore these bits. The Class and the Number are encoded separately, just to make the
processing easier. Therefore, this attribute contains the following fields:
• Class: The Class field is a 3-bit numeric value which contains the hundredth digit
of the error code and must be between 3 and 6.
• Number: The Number field is a 8-bit numeric value which contains the last 2 digits,
tens and units of the error code.
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• Reason Phrase: The Reason Phrase field is encoded in UTF-8 and is a textual
phrase which has a brief description of the error. It has variable length, depending
of the extension of the phrase.
As mentioned above, it is recommended to use phrases defined in other protocols, such
as HTTP and SIP. The most common errors are defined below and the reason phrase is
defined by the sender:
• 300: “Try Alternate ”. The client should contact an alternate server for this request.
• 400: “Bad Request”. The request was malformed.
• 401: “Unauthorized”. The request did not contain the correct credentials to proceed.
The client should retry later with proper credentials.
• 420: “Unknown Attribute”. The attribute contained in the message is not under-
standable by the server.
• 500: “Server Error”. The server has suffered a temporary error, and the client should
try again later.
Unknown-Attribute
The Unknown-Attributes attribute is only used in the presence of an Error-Code 420.
This attribute must contain a list of 16-bit attribute types that were not understood by
the server. The format of this list is illustrated in figure 3.10.
ATTRIBUTE 1 TYPE (16 bits) ATTRIBUTE 2 TYPE (16 bits)
ATTRIBUTE 3 TYPE (16 bits) . . . . . . . 
Figure 3.10: Format of Unknown-Attributes Attribute
Software
The Software attribute is an attribute with variable length. It can be sent by clients
and servers, and must contain a textual description of the software that is used by the
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agent that sends the STUN message. Typically the attribute has no impact in the main
operation of the protocol and is used as a tool for diagnosis and debugging purposes. It
must contain a UTF-8 encoded textual message smaller than 128 characters (which can
be a maximum of 763 bytes).
Chapter 4
Network Security
4.1 Introduction
In the early nineteenth century it took weeks and weeks for government agencies to send a
message to different cities. In the late nineteenth century the telegraph cut this time and
only took a few hours. At the dawn of the twenty and twenty-first century, the time has
been cut to a fraction of second with the telephone and Internet, and not just governmental
institutions but most of the citizens and companies can easily communicate with each
other. The result is that we now conduct more our communications, whether personal,
business, or civic, via electronic channels. The availability of such easy communications
has transformed not just the internationalization of the commerce, but also governmental
and personal relations in remote parts of the world.
These developments in technology have also had a profound impact in terms of privacy.
Today, most people use telephone (including cellphones) daily, and a constant use of
electronic mail, electronic commerce and much more services on the World Wide Web.
However, the reality is that the Internet and the web are extremely vulnerable and can
compromise communications, that by their essence can be naturally intercepted with dif-
ferent methods [21].
This chapter introduces the web security and its considerations, cryptography, and the
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, providing the essential information to under-
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stand the implementation of a secure channel between two entities. It begins with a very
brief look at Network security and electronic commerce, followed by cryptography focus-
ing on the issues that led to the creation of the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol. The
next section contains a brief description of the SSL protocol and its transformation into
TLS.
4.2 Approaches to Network Security
The rapid development of the networks and the communications naturally led to business
companies, government agencies, and many individuals to easily access the World Wide
Web, and the usage of graphical Web browsers became popular. They become responsi-
ble for a big part of the traffic on the Internet, and privacy issues become more serious.
Unfortunately the reality is that the Internet and the Web are extremely vulnerable, and
communications can be easily intercepted. Business, governmental agencies and individu-
als woke up to this reality, and the demand for secure Web services grows [21].
Accordingly to Oppliger [22] in the first half of the 1990s, people started to purchase items
electronically. As an example, among the electronic payment systems, credit card trans-
actions are the most widely used. Thus, providing Web transactions security, is nowadays
a demanding challenge and extremely important. The greatest common dominator of all
these possibilities was the use of cryptographic techniques. However, for the TCP/IP
stack, there was hardly any consensus about which cryptographic techniques to use and
what layer to apply them. The remaining paragraphs of this section are based on the
chapter 3 of SSL and TLS: Theory and Practice by Rolf Oppliger [22].
After analysis and discussions, many security protocols were proposed. There are many
possibilities to invoke cryptographic techniques at various layers of the TCP/IP protocol
stack, in order to secure web transactions. Several Internet security protocols and their
placement in the TCP/IP stack are illustrated in figure 4.1 and explained below:
• Network Access Layer: On the Network Access Layer (often called Link Layer
on RFC 1122 [23]), IEEE 802.1AE [24] (also known as MACsec), defines data origin
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PGP / OpenPGP / S/MIME
S-HTTP Kerberos
SSL / TLS / DTLS
IPsec / IKE
Application Layer
Transport Layer
Network Layer
Network Access Layer
IEEE 802.1AE
PPTP / L2TP (IPsec/IKE)
Figure 4.1: The Internet security protocols in the TCP/IP stack1
authentication, connectionless confidentiality and integrity services to MAC frames.
Also, there are several virtual private networking (VPN) technologies and protocols,
such as the Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) or the Layer 2 Tunneling
Protocol (L2TP) combined with IPsec/IKE, to provide users secure access to their
organization’s network (see next bullet). These protocols can also be used to estab-
lish secure connections in web transactions.
• Network Layer: On the Network Layer (often called Internet Layer on RFC 1122
[23]), to establish secure connections between two IP entities, there are Internet
Protocol Security (IPsec) and Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [25]. These protocols
can be used to establish secure connections in web transactions. The nice thing
about applying security at this level is that it co-resides with IP, and hence all
Internet applications are layered on top of them. Thus, it can be used to secure all
the Internet connections. However, the minus side about IPsec/IKE is that protocols
are overly complex and this makes the deployment and operation of IPsec/IKE quite
tricky.
• Transport Layer: On the Transport Layer, the goal is to enhance the current
transport protocols and invoke cryptographic techniques to provide secure commu-
nications and basic security services for web transactions. SSL/TLS is the choice to
enhance Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) on which protocols such as HTTP,
SMTP and FTP are layered. Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) is the
1Adapted from Oppliger [22]
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choice to provide security over User Datagram Protocol (UDP) connections.
• Application Layer: On the Application Layer, the goal is to provide security
enhancing the actual application or protocol in use. In this case, it is possible either
to invoke cryptographic techniques to enhance HTTP (called S-HTTP, that is the
alternative to HTTPS), or to invoke an authentication and key distribution system
such as Kerberos to actually archieve the same level of security.
Beyond these protocols, there is also the possibility to protect web transactions in a way
that is independent from the transmission techniques. For this purpose we can have a
layer above the application layer, for example to provide secure messaging like Pretty
Good Privacy (PGP), OpenPGP or Secure MIME (S/MIME) [26].
The placement of the security protocols in the TCP/IP stack have different reasons and
consequences, and all the possibilities have advantages and disadvantages. Providing secu-
rity at a low layer has the advantage that higher layers (for example applications) become
immune and need not to be modified or to care about security in web transactions. Pro-
viding security at a high layer has the advantage that it has no impact on the networking
infrastructure, and hence the infrastructure need not to be modified.
For this approach, there is a famous principle that strongly recommends to provide security
services at a high layer. Accordingly to the end-to-end principle in system designs [27],
whenever possible, communications protocol operations should be defined to occur at
the end-points of a communications system, or as close as possible to the resource being
controlled. As an exception, the principle also states that protocol features are only
justified at lower layers of the system just if there is a performance optimization.
Following the end-to-end principle, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) chartered
a Web Transaction Security (WTS) Working Group (WG) in the early 1990s 2. The
goal of the Web Transaction Security Working Group was to develop requirements and a
specification for the provision of security services to Web transaction, e.g., transactions
using HTTP. In late 1993 Allan Schiffman and Eric Rescorla, then with Enterprise In-
tegration Technologies (EIT), came up with a proposal to enhance the HTTP protocol
2http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/OLD/wts-charter.html
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with the possibility to encrypt data over the communication. This proposal was named
Secure HyperText Transfer Protocol (S-HTTP or SHTTP), and was a message-oriented
application-layer protocol. The IETF Web Transaction Security (WTS) working group
was chartered in 1995 to consider this protocol and it concluded and published S-HTTP
as an experimental RFC 2660 [28] authored by Rescorla and Schiffman (then with Terisa
Systems) in 1999.
However, things evolved differently and independently from the end-to-end principle and
the S-HTTP protocol proposal, and the developers at Netscape Communications (com-
monly known as Netscape) sustained the claim that security at the Transport Layer pro-
vides interesting security between the low and high layers. They wanted to create a
protocol that could establish secure connections to applications as simply as possible. To
achieve this goal, they decided to create an intermediate layer between the Application
Layer and the Transport Layer, which was called Secure Sockets Layer (SSL). Its job was
to provide to application developers an easy way to handle security, meaning that it had to
establish secure connections and transmit data over the secure connections. The first SSL
version was the SSL 1.0, and later upgraded to SSL 2.0 and SSL 3.0. Later, the Transport
Layer Security (TLS) was defined as an upgrade to the SSL 3.0. The TLS 1.0 (also called
as SSL 3.1) was the first version, and then upgraded to TLS 1.1 (also called as SSL 3.2).
Nowadays, the TLS protocol is already in the version TLS 1.2 (also called as SSL 3.3),
and it provides security with more cryptographic algorithms and extensions.
As explained in Chapter 1, this thesis focus in a TLS protocol implementation. Hence, the
next sections focus on the essential contents to better understand the SSL/TLS protocol
in the section 4.6.
4.3 Security Attacks
As explained before, communications can be easily intercepted by skilled programmers or
hackers, that gain access to a network to intercept the normal flow of communications.
The easiest way to protect a network from an outside attack is to close it off completely
from the outside world. A closed network provides connectivity only to trusted known
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parties and sites. A closed network does not allow a connection to public networks.
However, if we are talking about a private building, or campus, not everyone is trustable,
or a attacker can somehow gain access to the private network. This section is based on
the chapter 1 of Network Security Essentials: Applications and Standards, by William
Stallings, 2010.
In general, there is a flow of information between two peers. The first peer A can be
considered the information source that sends information to a destination peer B. Different
threats are depicted in Figure 4.2. The first figure 4.2(a) shows the normal flow in a
communication, and the following four are the general categories of threats:
A
Information 
source
Information 
destination
B
(a) Normal flow
A B
(b) Interruption
A B
T
(c) Interception
A B
T
(d) Modification
A B
T
(e) Fabrication
Figure 4.2: Security Threats3
• Interruption: Part of the communication system between two entities is destroyed
or becomes unavailable or unusable. This can be considered an attack of availabil-
ity. Examples include destruction of pieces of hardware such as hard disk, cutting
3Adapted from Stallings [29]
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off the communication line, disabling management system, etc.
• Interception: An unauthorized Peer T gains access to the network and intercepts
the information that is going on the communication line. This is an attack of con-
fidentiality. The unauthorized peer can be a person, a computer or a program.
Examples include capturing data in a network and unauthorized copy of programs
and files.
• Modification: An unauthorized Peer T not only gains access to the network to
intercept the information, but tampers it to send to the destination B. This is an
attack of integrity. The unauthorized peer can be a person, a computer or a
program. Examples include modifying the content of messages transmitted in a
network, changing values in a data file or altering a program to perform differently.
• Fabrication: An unauthorized Peer T inserts data into the communication system.
This is an attack of authenticity. Examples include the insertion of messages in a
network or the addition of records to a file.
The following figure 4.3 represents these attacks in terms of passive and active attacks.
Passive Attacks
Security Attacks
Active Attacks
Traffic 
Analysis
Passive 
Eavesdropping
Tampering Spoofing Hijacking Replay Denial of 
Service
Figure 4.3: Passive and Active Security attacks
4.3.1 Passive Attacks
A passive attack is an attack where an unauthorized attacker monitors or listens the
communication between two parties. Passive attacks are in the nature of eavesdropping on,
or monitoring of, transmissions, and the goal is to obtain information being transmitted.
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There are two types of passive attacks:
• Traffic Analysis: Usually, before mounting an active attack, attackers have to
collect sufficient information about the network or the user. The operation of traffic
analysis gives to the attacker a basic information going on the network, such as,
network information, activity on the network, protocols being used, etc.
• Passive Eavesdropping: This attack is very similar to the traffic analysis attack,
because the attacker collects information from the network, but at the same time also
accesses and reads the sensitive contents of the message. If the message is encrypted
it requires the attacker to break the encryption to read the message.
Passive attacks are very difficult to detect because they do not involve modification of the
data. However, dealing with passive attacks is on prevention rather than detection. The
common technique for masking messages is encryption.
4.3.2 Active Attacks
An active attack is an attack where an unauthorized attacker modifies a data stream or
creates a false stream. The attacker has the ability to transmit data to one or both of the
parties, or block the data stream in one or both directions. There are 5 types of active
attacks:
• Tampering: Tampering or modification of messages, is when an attacker monitors
the network traffic and maliciously captures the message and modifies the content.
The messages can be simply altered, delayed or reordered, to produce an unautho-
rized effect.
• Spoofing: Spoofing or masquerading, is when an attacker forges network data and
successfully masquerades as another by falsifying data and thereby gaining an illegit-
imate advantage. This sort of attack can be used to thwart systems that authenticate
based on host information. Man-in-the-middle attack is a common attack where the
attacker tricks both communicating parties into communicating with him. Both
parties think they are talking to each other when in fact the entire conversation is
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controlled by the attacker. Other examples of known attacks are IP spoofing, URL
spoofing and phishing, referrer spoofing, poisoning of file-sharing networks, caller ID
spoofing and e-mail address spoofing.
• Hijacking: Hijacking is the next step after the authentication of a legitimate user.
A spoofing attack can be used to “hijack” the connection. Session hijacking is
a common attack that involves taking control of the session. The attacker takes
control of the session and the victim thinks that the session is no longer in operation
whatever the cause. Usually this attack can make use of the session cookies to gain
unauthorized access to information or services in a computer system. A common
method to hijack a web session is using the technique Session Sidejacking. Another
common attack is the technique SSL Hijacking that is used to hijack SSL connections.
• Replay: Replay attack involves the passive capture of data in a network, and its
subsequent retransmission to produce unauthorized effect. An attacker can record
and replay network transactions. For example in web commerce, if the protocol is
not properly designed and secured, an attacker can record a single transaction and
then replay it later when the stock price has dropped, doing it repeatedly until all
the stock is gone.
• Denial of Service: Denial of service (DoS) attack is often used and famously known
to bring down systems. The main aim is to bring down systems to prevent them
from responding to the users requests. Usually this is done by sending huge amount
of traffic to the system, in order to prevent a computer or service from functioning
efficiently or at all, temporarily or indefinitely. Other level of a DoS attack, a
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), is the version of a DoS in a distributed way,
in which an attacker makes use of multiple computers previously compromised by
taking advantage of security vulnerabilities or weaknesses, to launch the DoS attack.
Active attacks have the opposite characteristics of passive attacks. As explained before
in the section 4.3.2, passive attacks are very difficult to detect but solutions to prevent
the success of these attacks are available. In the case of active attacks, they are very
difficult to prevent absolutely. For this reason, the goal should be to detect the security
36 CHAPTER 4. NETWORK SECURITY
attacks and somehow recover from them. However, past detections also contribute to
future preventions, so it has a direct effect in prevention as well.
4.4 Security Services
As explained before, the primary goal in network security is to prevent attacks and to
secure important data that passes through the network. There are many different ways
to secure data, for example with cryptography, that can provide security services to ap-
plications. There is no universal agreement about security services. However, accordingly
to Stallings [29], one useful classification of security services agrees with both ITU-T rec-
ommendation X.800 [30] and RFC 2828 [31], and is the following:
• Authentication: The authentication service is used to prove the identity of an
entity, assuring that a communication is authentic. In single messages or connections,
authentication is usually used to assure to the recipients that the message is from the
source that it claims to be. In bidirectional communications it can be required for
both parties of the communication to perform authentication. In both situations the
service must ensure that the connection is not interfered by a third party that can
masquerade as one of the two legitimate parties, to transmit and receive messages.
• Data Confidentiality: The idea of confidentiality is to keep secret information
or data from others without proper credentials. Confidentiality can be seen as the
protection of transmitted data from passive attacks. In practice, in data commu-
nications between two entities, the goal is to prevent attackers to read the data.
Nowadays, cryptography is the key to provide data confidentiality. In addition, a
brief clarification of cryptography will be given in the next sections.
• Data Integrity: As with confidentiality, data integrity service is used to keep
secret messages, not just from being read, but avoiding modifications in the original
messages. Integrity service relates to active attacks. The goal is to ensure that
messages are received as sent, with no duplication, insertion, modification, reordering
or replays. The service must cover the destruction of the data as well. Plenty of
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well-known checksums exist and are discussed in the next sections.
• Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation service is used to prevent either sender and
receiver from denying having transmitted messages. Thus, with cryptography (Dig-
ital Signatures) it is possible to enable the receiver of a message to prove that the
message he received was sent by the alleged sender. Similarly the sender is enabled
to prove that the message was in fact sent to the alleged receiver.
• Access Control: The Access Control service is used to limit and control the access
to host systems and applications. To make such control and deny entities to gain
unauthorized access, each entity should be first identified or authenticated, and then
access rights can be tailored to the individual.
• Availability Service: Loss or reduction of availability can be caused by a variety
of attacks. The goal is that a system should be able to prevent or recover from loss
of availability of elements of a distributed system.
4.5 Cryptography
As explained in the previous section, there are many different ways to secure data, one of
them being cryptography. Cryptography is the science that studies ways to keep secrecy of
information. People might want to send secure information over insecure channels. A com-
puter network or telephone line are examples of insecure channels. The common example
assumes a sender Alice that wants to send a message m to a receiver Bob. The message can
be intercepted and read by the eavesdropper Trudy. Or even worse, the message can be
intercepted and modified. For this purpose, the communication might require authentica-
tion, confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation services. Cryptography is then used to
provide methods or services to prevent the type of attacks described in section 4.3. In this
section we provide a brief introduction to cryptography, giving a basic overview and basic
principles of cryptography as far as they are relevant for a proper understanding of the
SSL/TLS protocols. Five types of cryptographic algorithms are discussed: symmetric key
encryption, public key encryption, cryptographic hash functions, message authentication
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codes, and digital signatures.
4.5.1 Symmetric Encryption
Symmetric Encryption, also referred to as conventional encryption, secret-key, or single-
key encryption, allows encrypted communication between two endpoints using a single
shared key. It is called symmetric encryption because it uses the same key for encryption
and decryption. This encryption is actually used to provide Confidentiality.
Plaintext
input
Transmitted
ciphertext
Plaintext
output
Secret key shared by
sender and recipient
Secret key shared by
sender and recipient
Encryption algorithm
(e.g., AES)
Decryption algorithm
(reverse of encryption
algorithm)
K
X
Y = E[K, X] X = D[K,Y]
K
Figure 4.4: Working principle of a symmetric encryption system4
The working principle of a symmetric encryption system is illustrated in figure 4.4. On
the left side, the sender Alice wants to send a message to the receiver Bob. Alice and
Bob share the same key K to encrypt and decrypt messages. Then, Alice encrypts the
plaintext message X with the encryption function E (parametrized with the key K ). The
resulting ciphertext Y = E[K,X] is sent to the recipient Bob over a potentially insecure
channel. On the right side, the recipient Bob receives the ciphertext Y and decrypts with
the decryption function D (again parametrized with the key K ). If the decryption process
is successful, the recipient is able to recover the plaintext message X = D[K,Y] sent by
Alice.
The primary disadvantage of this approach, is the distribution of the key, that must remain
secret. In particular, the difficulty remains in exchanging the secret key, since one has to
exchange the keys in the same insecure channel. Sending the key in cleartext leaves open
the possibility for attackers to capture the key. The solution for this problem is to use
4Reprinted from Stallings [29]
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a cryptographic key exchange protocol, also known as public key infrastructure, and is
explained in the next section.
Secret key cryptography schemes are generally categorized as being either stream ciphers
or block ciphers:
• Block cipher: it operates on a single bit (byte or computer word) at a time and
implements some form of feedback mechanism so that the key is constantly changing.
• Stream cipher: it operates on individual bits or bytes, and the actual transformation
varies during the encryption process.
Block ciphers, are often used in many secure Internet protocols including PGP, SSL/TLS,
and IPsec. A block cipher can operate for example in the Electronic Code Book (ECB), or
more preferably in the CipherBlock Chaining (CBC) mode. Alternatively, a block cipher
can be turned into a stream cipher by operating in the Cipher FeedBack (CFB) or in the
Output FeedBack (OFB) [22]. For more information read the literature [32].
In SSL/TLS protocol, symmetric encryption is commonly used for data bulk encryption,
just after the two parties agreed on a shared key. However, encrypting a message does not
guarantee that the message is not changed while encrypted. Hence often a Message Au-
thentication Code (MAC) is added to a ciphertext to ensure that changes to the ciphertext
will be noted by the receiver.
Today, there are a number of popular block cipher and stream cipher algorithms. Thus, we
are going to explain the most relevant symmetric encryption algorithms for the SSL/TLS
protocol.
Data Encryption Standard (DES)
The DES was designed by IBM in the 1970s and it was adopted as a standard in FIPS PUB
46 [33] by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). DES is a block-
cipher that has an effective key length of only 56 bits, and operates on 64-bit blocks. DES
is the most common scheme used today. It has a complex set of rules and transformations
that were designed specifically to yield fast hardware implementations and slow software
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implementations, although this last point is becoming insignificant since the computers are
much faster today than twenty years ago. The overall security of DES seems to be good and
the encryption algorithm is surprisingly resistant against the most powerful cryptanalytical
attacks (differential and linear attacks). The major weakness and vulnerability of DES is
the restricted key length of 56 bits. This means that an exhaustive key search (brute force
attack) can be done in 256 operations in the worst case, with an average 255 operations.
Thus, with this method, specialists have built algorithms to break DES keys very easily
and it became perfectly feasible today. One feasible attack is the EFF DES cracker [34],
and in 1999 the duration of brute-force attack against DES could be less than 24 hours
[35].
Because of the short times of the brute force attacks, the use of DES cannot be recom-
mended anymore. In many applications, DES is replaced with a multi-iteration version
of it. Triple DES (3DES) is one DES variant and consists of three DES keys, employing
168-bit keys (three times 56), making three encryption/decryption passes over the block.
3DES is also described in FIPS PUB 46-3 [33]. The major disadvantage of 3DES is per-
formance, since a 3DES implementation is roughly three times slower than a normal DES
implementation [22].
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
In 1997, the U.S. NIST initiated a public competition to develop a new cryptosystem to
be the successor of DES. The result of this competition was the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES), that became the official successor of DES, and was published in FIPS
PUB 197 [36]. AES uses secret key cryptography scheme called Rijndael, a block cipher
designed by Belgian cryptographers Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen. The algorithm
uses a fixed block size of 128 bits, and allows any combination of keys lengths of 128, 192
or 256 bits. The three official versions of AES are shown on table 4.1.
Unlike DES, the AES has a clean mathematical structure. Until today, there is no register
of techniques to break the AES more efficiently than a brute force attack. A related-key
attack can break 256-bit AES with a complexity of 299.5, which is faster than brute force
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Block size Key length Number of rounds
AES-128 128 128 10
AES-192 128 192 12
AES-256 128 256 14
Table 4.1: The three official versions of AES.
but is still infeasible. 192-bit AES can also be defeated in a similar manner, but at a
complexity of 2176 which is also infeasible. 128-bit AES is not affected by this attack
[22].
RC4
Designed by Ron Rivest in 1987, Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4) stands as a trademark, so it is
often referred to as ARCFOUR or ARC4. RC4 is a stream cipher that uses variable-
sized keys, meaning that it generates a stream of pseudo-random bits (a keystream). This
ability to handle variable-length keys is one of the advantages of RC4. RC4 is widely used
in commercial applications including Oracle SQL, Microsoft Windows and the SSL.
In spite of the fact that RC4 is more than 20 years old, no serious vulnerability had been
found so far. However, while remarkable for its simplicity and speed in software, weak-
nesses have been found in RC4 that argue against its use in new systems. The keystream
generated is biased in varying degrees towards certain bit sequences. This weakness has
been exploited and can lead to very insecure cryptosystems in Wired Equivalent Privacy
(WEP) encryption used in Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs). In 2001 Scott Fluhrer,
Itsik Mantin, and Adi Shamir published an analysis of the RC4 stream cipher [37]. Some
time later, it was shown that this attack could be applied to WEP and the secret key
could be recovered from about 4,000,000 to 6,000,000 captured data packets. In 2004 a
hacker named KoReK improved the attack and the complexity of recovering a 104 bit
secret key was reduced to 500,000 to 2,000,000 captured packets. In 2005, Andreas Klein
presented another analysis of the RC4 stream cipher [38]. Klein showed that there are
more correlations between the RC4 keystream and the key than the ones found by Fluhrer,
Mantin, and Shamir which can additionally be used to break WEP in WEP like usage
modes. Finally in 2007, Erik Tews, Ralf-Philipp Weinmann and Andrei Pyshkin extended
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Klein’s attack and optimized it for usage against WEP, breaking a 104 bit WEP key in
40,000 captured packets with 50% success probability. For 60,000 available data packets,
the success probability is about 80% and for 85,000 data packets about 95% [39].
RC2
Also designed by Ron Rivest in 1987, Rivest Cipher 2 (RC2) is a 64-bit block cipher that
uses variable-sized keys between 8 and 128 bits, to replace DES. The algorithm operates
in 18 rounds. In 1997 John Kelsey, Bruce Schneier and David Wagner published an
analysis to various block ciphers, including RC2 that was cryptanalysed using 234 chosen
plaintexts [40]. Consequently, nowadays RC2 is considered to be weak, and its usage
should be avoided (at least for any security-critical application).
International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA)
The International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) is a block cipher that was originally
designed by James Massey and Xuejia Lai, intended to substitute DES and was first
described in 1991. IDEA also stands as a trademark, and it is best known for its usage
in former versions of the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). IDEA is a 64-bit block cipher and
uses 128 bits of key length. The algorithm operates in 8.5 rounds. IDEA was designed
to be resistant against differential cryptanalysis and related attacks. Consequently it has
been very successful, as no successful linear or algebraic weaknesses have been reported
so far [22]. In 2007 Eli Biham, Orr Dunkelman and Nathan Keller published the best
attack, a high-order differential-linear attack requiring 264-252 chosen plaintexts, reducing
its operation to 6 rounds (instead of the original 8) with a complexity of 2126.8 encryptions
[41].
Skipjack
The Skipjack is a block cipher that was developed by the U.S. National Security Agency
(NSA) and it was intended for use in the controversial Clipper chip. The Clipper chip
was not successful, so they decided to implement also in FORTEZZA cards, in addition
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to a digital signature system, SHA-1 and a key exchange algorithm (KEA) (known as
FORTEZZA KEA). Skipjack is a 64-bit block cipher and uses 80 bits of key length. The
algorithm operates in 32 rounds [42]. In terms of weaknesses, there are no registers of a full
version attack to Skipjack. In 1999 Eli Biham, Alex Biryukov and Adi Shamir published
one article explaining an attack against 31 of the 32 rounds of Skipjack [43], but they
were not been able to find attacks against the full version. Up to today, this is the best
cryptanalysis of Skipjack known to the public.
Camelia
Camelia is a block cipher that was developed by Mitsubishi and Nippon Telegraph and
Telephone (NTT) in 2000. It is a 128-bit block cipher and similarly to AES can use
128, 192 or 256 bits of key length. The number of rounds is 18 (for 128-bit keys) or 24
(for 192-bot or 256-bit keys) [44][45]. Also Camelia was designed to be suitable for both
software and hardware implementations and to be resistant against known block cipher
attacks. Due to the fact that its definition is similar to AES, theoretically, in the future,
it might be possible to break Camelia (and AES) using an algebraic attack. With today’s
technology, such an attack would take years to compute, and thus it is not realistic.
4.5.2 Public Key Encryption
Asymmetric Encryption, also commonly referred to as Public Key Encryption, allows
encrypted communication between two parties without the need for prior negotiation of
secret keys. It is called asymmetric encryption because it uses different keys for encryption
and decryption. In the most popular form of public key cryptography, each party has two
keys, the private key that must remain secret, and the public key that can be freely
distributed. The two keys have a special mathematical relationship. A necessary (but
usually not sufficient) condition for a public key cryptosystem to be secure is that it is
computationally infeasible to compute the private key from the public key.
The working principle of a asymmetric encryption system is illustrated in figure 4.5(a).
On the left side, the sender Bob wants to send a message to the receiver Alice. Alice had
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(a) Encryption with public key. Working principle of an asymmetric encryption
system.
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(b) Encryption with private key. Working principle of a digital signature system.
Figure 4.5: Public Key Cryptography5
previously generated a pair (public key PUA, private key PRA). Bob knows Alice public
key, and encrypts the plaintext message X with the encryption function E (parametrized
with Alice’s public key PUA). The resulting ciphertext Y = E[PUA, X] is sent to the
recipient Alice over a potentially insecure channel. On the right side, the recipient Alice
receives the ciphertext Y and decrypts it with the decryption function D (parametrized
with her private key PRA). If the decryption process is successful, the recipient Alice is
able to recover the plaintext message X = D[PRA, Y ] sent by Bob, and Bob is assured
5Reprinted from Stallings [29]
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that the message can just be read by Alice.
The primary disadvantage of this approach, is that a public key cryptosystem is compu-
tationally slower and less efficient than secret key cryptography, thus it is not efficient
for data bulk transfer. Thus public key cryptosystems are mainly used for authentication
and key management and symmetric encryption for data bulk transfers. The result of
combining secret and public key cryptosystems are often called hybrid cryptosystems and
are frequently used in practice, including for example the SSL/TLS protocols.
As explained above, public key systems are commonly characterized by the use of a cryp-
tographic type of algorithm with two keys, one private and one public. Depending on the
application, the sender uses either the sender’s private key, the receiver’s public key, or
both to perform some type of cryptographic function. In broad terms, we can classify the
use of public-key cryptosystems into three categories [29]:
• Encryption/Decryption: The sender encrypts the message with the recipient’s
public key.
• Digital Signature: The sender signs the message with its private key. Signing is
achieved by a cryptographic algorithm applied to the message or to a small block of
data that is a function of the message.
• Key Exchange: The two sides cooperate to exchange a session key. Several different
approaches are possible, involving the private key(s) of one or both parties.
Algorithm Encryption/Decryption Digital Signature Key Exchange
RSA Yes Yes Yes
Diffie-Helman No No Yes
DSS No Yes No
Elliptic Curve Yes Yes Yes
Table 4.2: Applications for Public-Key Cryptosystems.
Some algorithms are suitable for all three applications, whereas others can be used only
for one or two of these applications. Table 4.2 indicates the applications supported by four
main algorithms briefly described below: RSA, Diffie Hellman, Digital Signature Standard
(DSS) and elliptic-curve cryptography [29].
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RSA
The RSA public key cryptosystem was originally designed by Ronal Rivest, Adi Shamir
and Lenoard Adleman in 1978 [46], and the letters RSA are the initials of their surnames,
listed in the same order as on the paper. RSA is used in hundreds of software products and
can be used for key exchange, digital signatures or encryption of small bulks of data. RSA
uses a variable size encryption block and variable size key. The key-pair is derived from a
very large number, n, that is the product of two prime numbers chosen according to special
rules. These primes may be 100 or more digits in length each, yielding an n with roughly
twice as many digits as the prime factors. The public key information includes n and a
derivative of one of the factors of n. An attacker cannot determine the prime factors of n
(and, therefore, the private key) from this information alone. This is what makes the RSA
algorithm so secure [47]. Just if someone finds an efficient integer factorization algorithm,
then the RSA public key cryptosystem would be broken. A more worrisome picture would
be the possibility to break RSA without having to factorize integers. However, it has not
been shown so far [22].
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
After publishing the article [48], Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman came up their own
implementation for key exchange. Diffie-Hellman (D-H) is used for secret-key exchange
only, and not for authentication or digital signatures. The purpose of the algorithm is to
enable two users to exchange a secret key securely that then can be used for subsequent
encryption of messages. The algorithm itself is limited to the exchange of the keys.
Like any other protocol that employs public key cryptography, the Diffie-Hellman key
exchange protocol is vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle attack. A person in the middle
may establish two distinct Diffie-Hellman key exchanges, one with Alice and the other
with Bob, effectively masquerading as Alice to Bob, and vice versa, allowing the attacker
to decrypt (and read or store) then re-encrypt the messages passed between them. A
method to authenticate the communicating parties to each other is generally needed to
prevent this type of attack. So, in practice, D-H protocol is usually combined with mutual
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authentication protocols to come up with an authenticated key exchange protocol. To
accomplish that, usually D-H is authenticated using RSA signatures. Consequently, digital
signatures and PKIs must be used to securely deploy authenticated key exchange protocols.
More information about Diffie-Helman can be found in the book [47]).
Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
The algorithm Digital Signature Standard (DSS) was published in FIPS PUB 186 by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and provides digital signature
capability for the authentication of messages. DSS makes use of SHA-1 and presents a
new digital signature technique, the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA). The DSS was
originally proposed in 1991 and revised in 1993 in response to public feedback concerning
the security of the scheme. There was a further minor revision in 1996. The last release
is the FIPS PUB 186-3. The DSS uses an algorithm that is designed to provide only the
digital signature function. Unlike RSA, it cannot be used for encryption or key exchange
[47].
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
The vast majority of algorithms and standards on Internet use public key cryptograpghy
for encryption and RSA for digital signature to be secure. RSA has been increasing the
bit length of its algorithm, giving higher levels of security but increasing the processing
time making a heavier processing load to the application. A heavier processing has per-
formance consequences in systems such as electronic commerce that support large number
of transactions, or light equipment such as Personal Digital Assistant (PDAs) that have
limited compute power and/or memory.
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) came up to compete with RSA. It is a public key
algorithm based on elliptic curves that appears to offer equal security than RSA for a far
smaller bit size, thereby reducing processing overhead. Its theory has been around for
some time but just recently a few implementations have begun to appear, as well as the
interest in probing for weaknesses. Thus, the confidence level in ECC is not yet as high
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as that in RSA [29]. More information can be found in the RFC 6090 [49].
Other Public-Key Cryptography Algorithms
One famous algorithm is FORTEZZA KEA, already mentioned above. It was designed
by NSA in 1994, and it basically refers to a modified Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol.
In short, a long-term certificate-based Diffie-Hellman key exchange is combined with a
ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Furthermore it used the block cipher Skipjack,
that is used to reduce the key to 80 bits long. The FORTEZZA KEA algorithm is not
going to be explained, since the full mathematical description is beyond the scope of this
thesis.
Another often used algorithm is the Secure Remote Password (SRP) protocol, and
it is a password-authenticated key agreement protocol. SRP allows a user to authenticate
himself to a server, it is resistant to dictionary attacks mounted by an eavesdropper, and
it does not require a trusted third party. SRP creates a large private key shared between
the two parties in a manner similar to Diffie-Hellman, then verifies to both parties that the
two keys are identical and that both sides have the user’s password. SRP is an agorithm
often used in SSL/TLS implementations. More information can be found in the RFC 2945
[50] and RFC 5054 [51].
Finally, another often used algorithm is the Pre-Shared Key (PSK), that is more often
called Transport Security Layer Pre-Shared Key (TLS-PSK) in SSL/TLS imple-
menations. TLS-PSK is a set of cryptographic protocols that provide secure communica-
tions using shared keys (symmetric keys). The main goal is to combine PSK with other
algorithms and provide a secured way to create secure communications. Nowadays there
are several ciphersuites: the first set of ciphersuites uses only symmetric key operations
for authentication; the second set uses a Diffie-Hellman key exchange authenticated with
a pre-shared key; the third set combines public key authentication of the server with pre-
shared key authentication of the client. More information can be found in the RFC 4279
[52] and RFC 4785 [53].
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4.5.3 Hash Functions
Hash functions, also called message digests or one-way encryption, are algorithms that,
in some sense, use no key. Instead, a fixed-length hash value is computed based upon
the plaintext that makes it impossible for either the contents or length of the plaintext
to be recovered. Hash algorithms are typically used to provide a digital fingerprint of a
file’s contents, often used to ensure that the file has not been altered by an intruder or
virus. Hash functions are also commonly employed by many operating systems to encrypt
passwords. Hash functions, then, provide a measure of the integrity of a file [47].
Examples of cryptographic hash functions are MD5 and SHA-1.
MD5
Message-Digest algorithm 5 (MD5) was originally designed by Ron Rivest and it generates
hash values of 128 bits (independent from the input message length). In terms of security,
many cryptographers have been successfully exploiting the algorithm, and have been able
to generate rogue CA certificates [22].
SHA
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA), an algorithm for NIST’s Secure Hash Standard (SHS) was
designed by Ron Rivest as well. Its algorithm is conceptually similar to MD5, but a little
stronger and slower. SHA-1 produces a 160-bit hash value and was originally published as
FIPS 180-1 and RFC 3174. FIPS 180-2 (aka SHA-2) describes five algorithms in the SHS:
SHA-1 plus SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 which can produce hash values
that are 224, 256, 384, or 512 bits in length, respectively. SHA-224, -256, -384, and -512
are also described in RFC 4634 [47].
4.5.4 Digital Signatures
As illustrated in figure 4.5(b), public key encryption can be used in other ways. Instead
of encrypting with the public key (ensuring secrecy), a sender Bob wants to encrypt the
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message with his private key (ciphertext) and then send it to the receiver Alice, ensuring
that the message is indeed from him. Alice receives the message and can decrypt it using
Bob’s public key, thus proving that the message must have been encrypted by Bob. No
one else knows Bob private key, so he is the only one that can create such ciphertext to be
decrypted with his public key. A secure hash code such as SHA-1 can be used to encrypt
the message with the sender’s private key. Therefore the message cannot be altered.
Thus, if Bob sends the ciphertext and the message in cleartext to the receiver Alice, she
can decrypt and compare the messages, checking its authenticity. Thus the message is
authenticated both in terms of source and in terms of data integrity. Digital signatures
can also provide non-repudiation, meaning that the signer cannot successfully claim he
did not sign a message, while also claiming their private key remains secret. However, it is
good to emphasize that this method does not provide confidentiality. When the message
is sent in clear text, it can be safe from alteration but not from eavesdropping.
4.5.5 Message Authentication Code
It is not always necessary to encrypt messages to protect their confidentiality. Sometimes it
can be sufficient to provide message authentication and integrity (meaning that a recipient
can receive a message and verify its authenticity and integrity). For this purpose, Message
Authentication Code (MAC) are used. A MAC algorithm accepts as input a secret key and
an arbitrary length message to be authenticated, and outputs a MAC (known as a tag).
The MAC value provides message data integrity and authenticity, by allowing verifiers
(who also possess the secret key) to detect any changes to the message content.
The most widely used MAC is Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC). HMAC
is a specific construction for calculating a message authentication code (MAC) involving
a cryptographic hash function in combination with a secret key. Any cryptographic hash
function, such as MD5 or SHA-1, may be used in the calculation of an HMAC, and the
resulting MAC algorithm is termed HMAC-MD5 or HMAC-SHA1 accordingly.
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4.5.6 Certificates
In a Public Key Infrastructure, although Bob could have sent a private message to Alice,
signed it, and ensured the integrity of the message, he still needs to be sure that he is
really communicating with Alice. In this case Alice can be a bank. This means that Bob
needs to be sure that the public key he is using corresponds to the bank’s private key.
Similarly, the bank may also want to verify that the message signature really corresponds
to Bob’s signature. If each party has a certificate which validates the other’s identity,
confirms the public key, and is signed by a trusted agency, then they both will be assured
that they are communicating with whom they think they are. Such a trusted agency
is called a Certificate Authority (CA), and Certificates are used for authentication and
prevent someone from impersonating a party with false key.
Usually SSL/TLS uses digital certificates to authenticate servers. However, it can be used
to authenticate clients as well. SSL and TLS uses X.509 certificates to validate entities.
X.509 certificates contain information about the entity, and the structure of an X.509 v3
digital certificate is shown in the table 4.3:
Certificate
Version
Serial Number
Signature Algorithm ID
Issuer Name
Validity
• Not Before Date
• Not After Date
Subject Name
Subject Public Key Info
• Public Key Algorithm
• Subject Public Key
Issuer Unique Identifier (optional)
Subject Unique Identifier (optional)
Extensions (optional)
Subject Public Key Info
Table 4.3: Content of an X.509 v3 Certificate.
As explained above, a trusted third party outside the server and client pair is needed to
validate the certificate, which is the certificate authority. Reputable certificate authorities,
such as VeriSign, are responsible for ensuring the trust of all World Wide Web entities.
In some cases it may be necessary to create a chain of certificates, each one certifying
the previous one. This hierarchy of trust is vital to the authentication of an entity. This
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process is called certificate chaining and is illustrated in figure 4.6.
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Tier 2
CA #6
Root CA
Figure 4.6: Hierarchy of Thrust6
4.6 Transport Layer Security (TLS)
After discussing many techniques to provide security, it is time to give one entire solution
to provide secure communications, for example in web commerce or bank transactions.
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is the successor of the Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL) protocol. In this section we will provide a historical and global overview of the
TLS 1.2 protocol, already including all the enhancements from the previous SSL and TLS
versions.
4.6.1 Introduction
Originally designed by Netscape, SSL 1.0 was the first version of SSL. The protocol was
updated to SSL 2.0 and SSL 3.0, which introduced authentication methods, digital signa-
tures and more security algorithms in order to provide more security. Afterwards, TLS 1.0
was first defined in RFC 2246 [55] in 1999 as an upgrade to SSL Version 3.0. As stated in
the RFC, “the differences between this protocol and SSL 3.0 are not dramatic, but they
are significant enough that TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0 do not interoperate.”However, TLS 1.0
does include a means by which a TLS implementation can downgrade the connection to
6Reprinted from Cisco [54]
4.6. TRANSPORT LAYER SECURITY (TLS) 53
SSL 3.0. Therefore TLS 1.0 can be viewed as essentially SSL 3.1. The same happens with
TLS 1.1 (SSL 3.2) defined in the RFC 4346 [56] and TLS 1.2 (SSL 3.3) defined in the
RFC 5246 [4]. The main upgrades between the new versions of the protocol were basically
the addition of protection against CBC attacks, authentication and hash algorithms, and
finally TLS extensions [22]. In the next sections we will provide a global overview of the
TLS 1.2 protocol, already including all the enhancements and previous protocols.
4.6.2 SSL/TLS Architecture
In the previous section we explained how the SSL protocol evolved in three versions (SSL
1.0, SSL 2.0 and SSL 3.0) to finally become the protocol we know today, TLS. The SS-
L/TLS protocol is a client/server protocol that provides the following basic security ser-
vices to the communication peers:
• Authentication services (peer entity and data origin authentication);
• Connection confidentiality services;
• Connection integrity services (without recovery);
In spite of the fact that the SSL/TLS protocol uses public key cryptography, it does
not provide non-repudiation services [22]. In terms of cryptography, all the algorithms
explained in section 4.5 can be used in SSL and TLS. As explained before, a public key
cryptosystem is computationally slower and less efficient than secret key cryptography,
thus is not efficient for data bulk transfer. For this reason, the common scheme is the
usage of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to exchange a secret key between the two peers.
Then the data bulk can be done using symmetric algorithms.
In terms of architecture, Netscape developers designed the SSL protocol as a separate
layer just for security. Looking at the TCP/IP stack, an application layered protocol
sends messages to the below transport layer protocol, that sends the message to the next
network layer below. SSL was created right between the application layer and the transport
layer, as shown in figure 4.7.
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Figure 4.7: The SSL with its sub-layers and sub-protocols7
SSL was initially designed to make use of TCP to provide reliable end-to-end secure service
(however today is possible to provide over UDP with DTLS). SSL is not a single protocol,
but rather two layers of protocols. TLS inherited the SSL architecture and its sub-layers
and sub-protocols are illustrated in figure 4.8.
SSL 
Handshake 
Protocol
SSL Change 
Cihper Spec 
Protocol
SSL Altert 
Protocol
Application 
Data Protocol
SSL Record Protocol
Figure 4.8: SSL Protocol Stack
The SSL/TLS protocol can be divided into two layers. The first layer consists of the
application protocol and the three sub-protocols: the Handshake Protocol, the Change
Cipher Spec Protocol, and the Alert Protocol. The Application data protocol just refers
to the application protocol that needs security (e.g. HTTP).
The second layer is the Record Protocol and it is used for encapsulation of higher-layer pro-
tocol data. Its purpose is to encrypt, authenticate, and optionally compress packets.
7Reprinted from Stallings [29]
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SSL/TLS Record Protocol
The Record Protocol is responsible for encapsulating messages for transmission over under-
lying communication protocols, usually TCP/IP. It takes messages from the upper layers
to be transmitted, fragments the data into manageable blocks, optionally compresses the
data, applies a MAC, encrypts, and transmits the result. Received data is decrypted,
verified, decompressed, reassembled, and then delivered to higher-level clients. Figure 4.9
indicates the overall operation of the SSL/TLS Record Protocol [29].
Application data
Fragment
Compress
Add MAC
Encrypt
Append SSL 
record header
Figure 4.9: SSL/TLS Record Protocol operation8
As explained before, just encrypting a message does not guarantee that this message is not
changed while encrypted. Hence often in SSL/TLS Record protocol a MAC is added to the
ciphertext to ensure that changes to the ciphertext will be noted by the receiver. Message
authentication codes can be constructed from symmetric ciphers (e.g. CBC-MAC).
The algorithms used in the record protocol operation depends on the parameters defined in
the Handshake protocol. A set of parameters are defined during the Handshake protocol,
and the record message is going to be encrypted accordingly to the parameters defined
during the handshake (in the cipher suite). In terms of encryption algorithms used to
encrypt the SSL/TLS record, there are several TLS cipher suites defined in the RFC 5246
8Adapted from Stallings [29]
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[4]. For more information read the section 4.6.2 about the Handshake Protocol.
The SSL/TLS Record format is illustrated in figure 4.10. It begins with a header. The
header includes the Content Type that refers to the higher layer protocol being used (refers
to one of the four sub-protocols, e.g. Alert); a protocol Version that referes to version
of the SSL protocol in use (e.g. SSL 3.3 aka TLS 1.2); and the Length in bytes of the
plaintext fragment. The body of the SSL/TLS record contains the message plus the MAC
in encrypted form.
Type Version Length MACSSLCiphertext structure (optionally compressed)
Encrypted
Majorversion
Minorversion
Figure 4.10: SSL/TLS Record format
SSL/TLS Change Cipher Spec Protocol
The Change Cipher Spec Protocol is one of the three sub-protocols that use the Record
Protocol, and it is the simplest. This protocol consists of a single message, which consists
of a single byte with the value 1. It is sent immediately after the handshake concludes
and before any application data messages are sent. Its purpose is to cause the pending
state to be copied into the current state, which updates the cipher suite to be used on the
connection [29].
SSL/TLS Alert Protocol
The Alert Protocol is used to send messages to indicate a change of status or an error
condition to the peer. A full list of messages can be found in RFC 5246 [4]. Alerts are
commonly sent when the connection is closed, an invalid message is received, a message
cannot be decrypted, or the user cancels the operation.
SSL/TLS Handshake Protocol
The Handshake Protocol is responsible for selecting a cipher suite and generating a master
secret, which together comprise the primary cryptographic parameters associated with a
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secure session. The handshake protocol can also optionally authenticate parties who have
certificates signed by a trusted certificate authority. The session information consists of
a session ID, peer certificates, the cipher suites to be used, the compression algorithm to
be used, and a shared secret that is used to generate keys. The protocol and its message
flows are illustrated in figure 4.11.
Client Server
Client Hello
Server Hello
Certificate *
Server Key Exchange *
Certificate Request *
Server Hello Done
Certificate *
Client Key Exchange
Certificate Verify *
[Change Cipher Spec]
Finished
[Change Cipher Spec]
Finished
Handshake Protocol
Record Protocol
Application Data
* Optional or situation-dependent messages
[Change Cipher Spec] is not a TLS handshake message but 
is an independent
Figure 4.11: SSL/TLS Handshake Protocol
Note that there are mandatory and optional messages, depending on the need in specific
situations. Note also that Change Cipher Spec is not actually an SSL/TLS Handshake
protocol message but represents an SSL/TLS protocol of its own, and hence a content
type. Table 4.4 lists the defined messages types in the handshake protocol.
The message flow with optional messages can adapt to different situations. Figure 4.12
illustrates the message flow of a Resuming Session, where the ID of the session will be
resumed, and there is no need of renegotiation of ciphers.
Establish Security Capabilities
This phase is used to initiate logical connections and to establish the security capabilities
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Message Type Parameters
Hello Request Null
Client Hello Version, random, session id, cipher suite, compression method
Server Hello Version, random, session id, cipher suite, compression method
Certificate Chain of X.509v3 certificates
Server Key Exchange Parameters, signature
Certificate Request Type, authorities
Server Hello Done Null
Certificate Verify Signature
Client Key Exchange Parameters, signature
Finished Hash Value
Table 4.4: Handshake Protocol Message Types.
Client Server
Client Hello
Server Hello
[Change Cipher Spec]
Finished
[Change Cipher Spec]
Finished
Handshake Protocol
Record ProtocolApplication Data
[Change Cipher Spec] is not a TLS handshake message but 
is an independent
Figure 4.12: Simplied SSL/TLS Handshake Protocol (Resuming Session)
that will be associated with it. The Client sends a Client Hello which includes the cipher
suite. After sending the Client Hello message, the client waits for the Server Hello from the
server, which will contain a single cipher suite selected by the server from those proposed
by the client.
A Cipher Suite is a combination of authentication, encryption, and Message Authentica-
tion Code (MAC) algorithms that are used to negotiate the security settings for security
protocols. In SSL/TLS it defines a key exchange algorithm and CipherSpec (encryption
algorithm for data bulk transfer, a message authentication code (MAC) algorithm and
others).
An example of a cipher suite is TLS RSA WITH DES CBC SHA, where TLS is the pro-
tocol version, RSA is the algorithm that will be used for the key exchange, DES CBC
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is the encryption algorithm (using a 56-bit key in CBC mode), and SHA-1 is the hash
function. For detailed information about supported cipher suites in the TLS 1.2 protocol
read the Appendix C and Appendix A.5 of the RFC 5246 [4].
The first element of the Cipher Suite is the Key Exchange method. The following key
exchange methods are supported:
• RSA: Key exchange and server authentication are combined with RSA. The secret
key is encrypted with the server’s public key previously sent in the server’s certificate;
• Fixed Diffie-Hellman (abbreviated DH): Key exchange with Diffie Hellman and
authentication using certificates certified by a certificate authority (CA). The server’s
certificate contains fixed Diffie-Hellman public parameters signed by the certificate
authority (CA). The client provides its Diffie-Hellman public key parameters either
in a certificate, if client authentication is required, or in a key exchange message;
• Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (abbreviated DHE): Key exchange with Diffie Hell-
man and authentication using DSA or RSA. DHE is used to create ephemeral (tem-
porary, one-time) secret keys. In this case, the Diffie-Hellman public keys are ex-
changed, signed using the sender’s private RSA or DSS key. The receiver can use
the corresponding public key to verify the signature. Certificates are used to au-
thenticate the public keys. This would appear to be the most secure of the three
Diffie-Hellman options because it results in a temporary, authenticated key;
• Anonymous Diffie-Hellman (abbreviated DH anon): The base Diffie-Hellman
algorithm is used, with no authentication. That is, each side sends its public Diffie-
Hellman parameters to the other, with no authentication. This approach is vul-
nerable to man-in-the-middle attacks, in which the attacker conducts anonymous
Diffie-Hellman with both parties;
• Fortezza: The technique defined for the Fortezza scheme.
Many possible solutions (in TLS 1.2) are also using Diffie-Hellman or RSA key exchange
with PSK or SRP authentication, or ECC. For more information read the literature [22].
Following the key exchange algorithm is the CipherSpec, which includes the following most
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common fields:
• Ciphers: RC2, RC4, DES, 3DES, AES, IDEA, Fortezza (some of them can be
combined with CBC);
• MACs: SHA and MD5.
4.6.3 Candidate Technologies
There are several implementations of the SSL and TLS protocol, which are free and open-
source. Sometimes choosing between the available implementations can be tough. In
this section we will provide a limited comparison of several of the most prominent li-
braries.
Due to the specifications of all the implementations, some of them do not fit in our list of
possible choices for different reasons. For example, Java Secure Socket Extension (JSSE)
implements SSL and TLS in Java environment, and such language was not compatible
with the framework. Therefore, our list of choices is limited to three options:
• GnuTLS: The GNU Transport Layer Security Library [57];
• NSS: Network Security Services [58];
• OpenSSL: A Open Source toolkit implementing the SSL and TLS protocols [59].
The following sections are based on the material of GnuTLS - Comparison of different
free TLS implementations[60] and gives a brief comparison between these three libraries,
comparing the features that directly relate to the SSL and TLS protocol.
Protocol Support
One of the initial comparisons is the protocol support. GnuTLS is presented as a technol-
ogy that implements the most advanced protocol versions, from the SSL 3.0 to the TLS
1.2. SSL 2.0 has been deprecated since 1996 and it has serious security flaws, but NSS
and OpenSSL opted to implement it. NSS and OpenSSL only support versions from the
SSL 2.0 to the TLS 1.0.
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Implementation SSL 2.0 SSL 3.0 TLS 1.0 TLS 1.1 TLS 1.2
GnuTLS No Yes Yes Yes Yes
NSS Yes Yes Yes No No
OpenSSL Yes Yes Yes No No
Table 4.5: Candidates’ Protocol Support.
Key Exchange, Encryption and MAC Algorithms
In order to provide different variations of security in the Handshake protocol, the Key Ex-
change Algorithms implemented by the three options are significantly important. GnuTLS
implements all the algorithms except the Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE). NSS
only provides RSA, DHE-RSA, DHE-DSS and SRP-DSS. OpenSSL provides the most used
algorithms such as RSA, DHE-RSA, DHE-DSS, DH-ANON, PSK and ECDHE.
Library RSA
DHE-
RSA
DHE-
DSS
DH-
ANON
SRP-
DSS
SRP-
RSA
SRP PSK
DHE-
PSK
ECDHE
GnuTLS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
NSS Yes
Yes
(client
only)
Yes
(client
only)
No Yes No No No No No
OpenSSL Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes No Yes
Table 4.6: Candidates’ Key Exchange Algorithms.
The Encryption Algorithms implemented by the three options are significantly important
as well. GnuTLS implements all the algorithms showed on table 4.7 except DES-CBC
because DES is considered insecure. NSS and OpenSSL implements all of them except the
AES-GCM, the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for the AES algorithm operation.
Library
AES-
CBC
AES-
GCM
3DES-
CBC
DES-
CBC
RC4-
128
RC4-
40
CAMELLIA-
CBC
GnuTLS Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
NSS Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
OpenSSL Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 4.7: Candidates’ Encryption Algorithms.
In terms of MAC functions, all the technologies presented implement HMAC-MD5, HMAC-
SHA-1 and HMAC-SHA-256. In addition, all technologies implement the DEFLATE com-
pression method.
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Development Environment
Other important comparison is the development environment. GnuTLS uses autoconf,
automake and libtool as building tools, it is very well documented with manuals and
Application Programming Interface (API) reference (both online and PDF format), and
it has limited compatibility with OpenSSL. NSS uses makefile as building tool, it is well
documented with a online manual, and it has compatibility with OpenSSL with a separate
package. OpenSSL uses makefile as building tool, and it is not so well documented as the
others, since the only known manuals are the man pages.
Portability Concerns
In terms of portability, GnuTLS requires the support of C89 (sometimes called ANSI C ),
and the libraries libgcrypt and libtasn1. It operates in most of the POSIX platforms or
Windows, including GNU/Linux, MacOS X, Solaris and major BSD variants. It is also
thread-safe when using mutex hooks.
Library
Platform
Requirements
Thread Safety Supported Operating Systems
GnuTLS
C89, libgcrypt,
libtasn1
Thread-safe, needs
custom mutex hooks if
neither POSIX or
Windows threads are
available.
Generally any POSIX platforms or Windows,
commonly tested platforms include GNU/Linux,
Win32/64, Mac OS X, Solaris, OpenWRT,
FreeBSD, NetBSD, OpenBSD.
NSS C89, NSPR Thread-safe
AIX, Android, FreeBSD, NetBSD, OpenBSD,
BeOS, HP-UX, IRIX, Linux, Mac OS X, OS/2,
Solaris, OpenVMS, Amiga DE, Windows,
WinCE, Sony Playstation
OpenSSL C89 Needs mutex callbacks
Unix, DOS (with djgpp), Windows, OpenVMS,
MacOS, NetWare
Table 4.8: Candidates’ Portability Concerns.
NSS is thread-safe, requires support for C89 and Netscape Portable Runtime (NSPR),
and it operates in most of Unix based platforms (including Android), Windows, Sony
Playstation and others. Lastly, OpenSSL requires support for C89, needs mutex callbacks
for thread safety and it operates in most of Linux platforms, DOS, Windows, MacOS and
others. These differences are showed on table 4.8.
Chapter 5
Protocols’ Implementation
Currently there is no standardized way in DOORS to implement a communication proto-
col. Deploying or implementing a protocol in the DOORS framework depends on a lot of
factors, and its design depends not just on its specifications but can also derive from an
integration of external libraries.
The most typical case, the deployment of simple protocols applies software engineering
principles in combination with formal methods towards the design of communication pro-
tocols. In this case, developers can use DOORS tools, such as Code Generators, to generate
code compatible with DOORS messages and Tasks, as explained in chapter 2. Thus, it
is possible to facilitate the deployment or implementation of a protocol using this set of
tools. However, a protocol may not have simple specifications and may be advantageous
to use external libraries. In this case other approaches may be investigated in order to
make possible a perfect integration in the DOORS framework.
The main objective of this chapter is to introduce the design of the protocols, to provide
a NAT traversal solution and secure communications in the DOORS framework. This
chapter is important to later on present the implementations. Since this dissertation
focuses on two different solutions (two protocols), this chapter is divided in two parts.
Firstly, as a NAT traversal solution, the design of the STUN protocol is presented in
the DOORS framework, that was previously discussed in chapter 3. Secondly, to provide
secure communications the choice is the TLS protocol previously discussed in chapter
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4. Since the two protocols have different specifications, their design is different in the
DOORS framework. In this chapter, a brief overview and discussion of the designs are
provided.
5.1 STUN Protocol
As explained before, Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) is a lightweight client-
server protocol to be used in the context of NAT traversal solutions. Not a solution itself,
STUN is rather a tool to be used with other protocols. In this section, the steps for the
design and implementation of this client-server protocol in the DOORS framework are
explained.
5.1.1 Considerations and Choices
After considering the STUN protocol’s specifications and several design ideas for the
DOORS framework architecture, the following design choices were made:
1. Client support for the STUN protocol;
2. STUN protocol operating over UDP;
3. Simple design and implementation of a STUN Task without external libraries;
STUN used in the context of NAT traversal solutions, needs a client and a server to
exchange information. As shown in chapter 3, the client party is the one interested to know
its public IP and port to somehow contact other parties and give them useful information
to be contacted back. For this reason, for the first design choice it was decided to provide
client support for the STUN protocol in the DOORS framework, assuming that there is
already a public STUN server in the network to provide server responses.
In terms of operation, STUN protocol can transmit messages in different ways. The goal of
this implementation is to provide NAT traversal solution for the most popular cases, and
gather a better understanding of the DOORS architecture. For this reason, for the second
design choice it was decided to simplify the implementation and send STUN messages just
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over UDP. It is also important to refer that this implementation must support IPv4 only.
The deployment of IPv6 eliminates the problem of NATs and certainly it is reasonable
to observe that achieving high address utilization densities is no longer the objective.
Probably IPv6 NATs will be implemented and used in the future, however it is out of the
scope of this thesis.
Looking at the integration perspective in the DOORS architecture, it is important to
understand the framework structure and how things work there. After considering sev-
eral design ideas in the DOORS architecture, it was decided to design and implement
the STUN protocol without help from other external libraries. Since STUN is a simple
client-server protocol, it would be easier just to create a STUN task inside DOORS and
use a auxiliary UDP task to send and receive messages over UDP. The resultant design
and implementation of this application should result in asynchronous and message-based
interactions between modules. Therefore, all these considerations are taken into account
in designing the STUN module.
5.1.2 Design Prototyping
This section describes the design prototyping for using STUN protocol in the DOORS
framework. It starts off with the background on how this design came about, and in the
next section it focuses on the details of the design itself.
The presented design was approached from creating a STUN task in the DOORS envi-
ronment that could give the support for the STUN protocol. The STUN task, called
StunTask, is the main creation of this architecture and its architecture is illustrated in
figure 5.1.
StunTask is located between a LEMon User task and the UdpTask. It should send and
receive messages from other tasks to use its functionalities, not calling functions or point-
ers, but rather just exchanging DOORS messages. In the DOORS environment, a Service
Data Unit (SDU) is used to identify exchanged DOORS messages between tasks. The
StunTask has a upper port and a lower port. User messages come from the upper port
and all the encoded and decoded PDUs should be connected to the lower port and sent to
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LEMon User
StunTask
SAP
FSM
peer
UdpTask
SDUs
SDUs
PDUs
UDPSockConn
Scheduler
I/O Handler
Figure 5.1: Architecture overview of STUN support in DORRS
the lower task. The structural modulation of the StunTask is presented in the sub-section
5.1.4.
The LEMon User Task is the environment responsible to monitor User events. It inherits
the EnvTask and gets inputs from the User, and sends user-defined messages to the Service
Access Point (SAP) of the StunTask.
The UdpTask is the intermediate between the Operating System (OS) and the StunTask,
and it is responsible to give UDP support. It is the one responsible to receive messages
from the StunTask and use a UDPSockConn device to send them via UDP to the network.
Messages coming from the device are sent to the StunTask.
In terms of overall architecture, the tasks are controlled by the Scheduler, and the I/O Han-
dler should be responsible to manage the devices required for the communication.
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5.1.3 Design Architecture
The previous section introduced the main blocks of the architecture. This section con-
tains a more detailed description, focusing on the StunTask. The design architecture is
illustrated in figure 5.2.
LEMon User
(EnvTask)
StunTask
SAP
FSM
peer
StunSAP::User usr
StunSAP::Provider up
UdpTask::User down
UdpTask
UdpTask::Provider up
DevIf::User down
Addr_req
Addr_ind
Error_ind
Dtreq Dtind
REQUEST
SUCCESSRESPONSE
ERRORRESPONSE
Figure 5.2: STUN Task support in DOORS
As explained before, the StunTask is the main creation of this architecture, and its imple-
mentation depends on three important formal protocol specifications:
• A Finite State Machine (FSM) to define the Task behaviour;
• A Service Access Point (SAP) to receive and transmit messages to the upper Task;
• A peer responsible to encode and decode Protocol Data Units (PDU);
The Finite State Machine (FSM) is a state machine that defines the behaviour of the
task. The Service Access Point (SAP) is a DOORS port through where the StunTask
sends/receives SDUs for/from the LEMon User. The port is called up, and the SDUs
exchanged are:
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• Addr req: Address request. The user wants to send a STUN Request and know
its reflexive address;
• Addr ind: Address indication. The StunTask received a SuccessResponse and
sends it to the user;
• Error ind: Error indication. The StunTask received a ErrorResponse and sends
it to the user;
Lastly, the peer is the one responsible to encode and decode PDUs. The defined PDUs
are:
• Request: It defines a STUN Request;
• SuccessResponse: It defines a STUN Successful Response;
• ErrorResponse: It defines a STUN Error Response;
The PDUs are encoded and automatically passed to the lower port down, to be sent using
the format required by the lower layer (UdpTask).
5.1.4 Modular Interaction and Behaviour
Traditionally, when designing a module in a system, it is required to evaluate the protocol
to implement and use its specifications for the modulation itself. In this case, from the
architecture shown before, the module to implement is the StunTask and it inherits from
PTask. The basis of designing the StunTask specifications depends on the following UML
and structure diagrams:
• Message Sequence Diagrams: Message sequence diagrams to define the network in-
teractions between peers;
• Protocol Data Unit (PDU): Structure of messages to be exchanged with other peers;
• Finite State Machine (FSM): A state machine defining the client behaviour;
These formal protocol specifications are based on the specifications of the STUN protocol
of chapter 3 and the RFC 5389 [3], and are explained below.
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Message Sequence Diagrams
The communication between two peers in the STUN protocol is a Request/Response
interaction. The STUN Client is the one interested to know its own reflexive address, and
starts the communication sending a STUN Request message to the STUN Server. The
Server reads the Request message and responds with a STUN Response message. The
Request message can be a SuccessfulResponse or an ErrorResponse. Regardless
of the type of message, if the STUN Client receives the Response correctly, the STUN
communication ends right there. The figure 5.3(a) illustrates this scheme.
STUN Client STUN Server
2: Response (1)
1: Request (1)
(a) Message sequence diagram for normal flow
STUN Client STUN Server
1: Request (1)
2: Response (1)
4: Response (1)
3: Request (1)
(b) Message sequence diagram with retrans-
missions
Figure 5.3: The message sequence diagrams for the Stun Task
However, as stated before in section 5.1.1, the STUN protocol is operating over UDP, a non-
reliable transport protocol. Therefore a message might be dropped by the network. For
this reason, reliability of STUN transactions is accomplished through retransmissions of
the Request message. A STUN Client waits on a timeout for Responses and retransmits
the STUN Request message if no message was received. This scheme is illustrated in
figure 5.3(b).
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Protocol Data Unit (PDU)
When sending messages through the network, it is important to define the content of
each STUN message. In this section three different PDUs are illustrated: Request,
SuccessfulResponse and ErrorResponse.
As mentioned above in the message sequence diagrams, the client sends a Request mes-
sage to the server in order to ask its own reflexive address. As illustrated in figure 5.4, a
STUN Request message starts with the usual 20-byte header and it can be followed by a
Software attribute. The Software attribute is optional and is just used for debug purposes.
Therefore, this field is quite often empty.
00 STUN MESSAGE TYPE (14 bits) MESSAGE LENGTH (16 bits)
MAGIC COOKIE (32 bits)
TRANSACTION ID (96 bits)
Software
Attribute
(optional)
Header
TYPE (16 bits) LENGTH (16 bits)
SOFTWARE (variable)
Figure 5.4: A STUN Request message
After having received the Request message, the server responds with a Response message:
SuccessfulResponse or ErrorResponse.
If nothing fails and the communication occurs normally, the Client might receive a Suc-
cessfulResponse. As illustrated in figure 5.5 a SuccessfulResponse starts with the
usual 20-byte header and it can be followed by an XOR-Mapped-Address attribute that
contains the client’s reflexive address.
If something goes wrong the communication might fail, and the Client might receive an
ErrorResponse. As illustrated in figure 5.6 an ErrorResponse starts with the usual
20-byte header and it can be followed by an Error-code attribute containing the error code
and the reason of the error. For certain errors, additional attributes might be added to
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TYPE (16 bits) LENGTH (16 bits)
XXXXXXXX (8 bits) X-PORT (16 bits)
X-ADDRESS (variable)
FAMILY (8 bits)
00 STUN MESSAGE TYPE (14 bits) MESSAGE LENGTH (16 bits)
MAGIC COOKIE (32 bits)
TRANSACTION ID (96 bits)
Header
Xor-
mapped-
Address
Attribute
Figure 5.5: A STUN SuccessfulResponse message
the message, for example with the error 420 (Unknown Attribute).
TYPE (16 bits) LENGTH (16 bits)
ATTRIBUTE 1 TYPE (16 bits) ATTRIBUTE 2 TYPE (16 bits)
ATTRIBUTE 3 TYPE (16 bits) . . . . . . . 
TYPE (16 bits) LENGTH (16 bits)
RESERVED, should be 0 (21 bits) NUMBER (8 bits)
REASON PHRASE (variable, maximum 763 bytes)
CLASS
(3 bits)
Unknown 
Attributes
00 STUN MESSAGE TYPE (14 bits) MESSAGE LENGTH (16 bits)
MAGIC COOKIE (32 bits)
TRANSACTION ID (96 bits)
Header
Error-
code
Attribute
Figure 5.6: A STUN ErrorResponse message
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Finite State Machine (FSM)
The state machine of the StunTask consists of two states. The initial state is “Idle”and
the StunTask waits for a Addr req to trigger the jump to the next state “Wait”. When
StunTask processes the trigger it will take two actions. It sends a Request message to
the peer and starts a timer.
After successful registration in the state “Wait”, the StunTask waits for Responses. If
the Response is not correct it waits for more responses. If there is a timeout and the
retry variable is less than five, then the StunTask should retransmit the Request and
restart the timer with the double of its initial time. StunTask will return to the initial
state “Idle”under two conditions: if there was an error during the communication and
no messages are received, then the fifth timeout triggers and StunTask should stop the
timer and gets ready to try again; if the Response received was correct, then everything
went well, and the StunTask should send a Addr ind or a Error ind to the LEMon user,
depending on the type of message received from the peer. Therefore, the communication
is completed and timer is set to off. The state machine of the StunTask is illustrated in
figure 5.7.
Idle Wait
Addr_req / (REQUEST, Start_timer(t))
RESPONSE not OK / Wait for more Responses
(Timeout, retry < 5) / 
(Retransmit REQUEST, Restart_timer (2t))
RESPONSE OK / 
(Addr/Err_Ind, EOT)
(Timeout, retry = 5) / Failed
Figure 5.7: The state machine for the Stun Task
5.1.5 Implementation
The STUN protocol design presented in figure 5.2, focuses on the implementation of a
StunTask module that is used to handle STUN requests and responses. The implemen-
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tation can be divided in two parts: Firstly the XML specifications for the C++ code
generators, and secondly the coding of the StunTask itself.
PTB Offline Tools
FSM Specs
(.sm)
SAP Specs
(.sap)
State Machine 
Generator
(dsmg)
SAP Generator
(dsapg)
Peer Generator
(dpeerg)
Peer Specs
(.pdu)
I
M
P
L
E
M
E
N
T
A
T
I
O
N
<stunsm>.h/.C
<stunsap>.h/.C
<stunpdu>.h/.i
<stunpdu>.C
<stuntask>.h/.C
DOORS 
Libraries
Figure 5.8: Stun Implementation
The implementation scheme is illustrated in figure 5.8. The files generated by the gener-
ators are C++ files and are used in the implementation.
XML-based Specifications
As explained in the section 5.1.3, the implementation of StunTask depends on three im-
portant formal protocol specifications: A Finite State Machine (FSM), a Service Access
Point (SAP) and a peer. Based on the diagrams illustrated and explained in the subsec-
tion 5.1.4, it was possible to create the XML specifications to be supplied to the Code
generators and transform them into C++ classes.
The PDUs were implemented using the dpeerg tool and its XML specification is included
in Appendix A.1.1. The state machine was implemented using the dsmg tool and its XML
specification is included in Appendix A.1.2. Finally, the SAP was implemented using the
dsapg tool and its XML specification is included in Appendix A.1.3.
The generated files are part of the implementation. The stunpdu.C file is not generated,
and it has to be manually coded, in order to give encode and decode functionality to the
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PDUs. Therefore, all these files are used in implementation of the task, that is explained
in the next sub-section.
StunTask Implementation
The StunTask inherits from PTask and it is the main task of this implementation. The
job of this task is to give the main behaviour to the STUN protocol. With the help of the
generated files and other DOORS functionalities, this task is manually coded taking care
of incoming events and giving action to the behaviour defined in the figures of the section
5.1.4.
As shown in figure 5.2, StunTask inherits from PTask and it communicates with the
LEMon user through the SAP port, and uses the peer to send PDUs. The StunTask class
is included in Appendix A.2.
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5.2 TLS Protocol
TLS is a security protocol to be used in the context of secure communications. It makes
usage of cryptographic algorithms in order to offer security to Application layer protocols.
In this section, the steps for the design and implementation of this security protocol in
the DOORS framework are explained.
5.2.1 Considerations and Choices
Chapter 4 presented TLS as a security protocol. TLS uses cryptographic algorithms to
offer a security layer between Application Layer and Transport Layer protocols. However,
cryptographic algorithms and other features presented in the TLS protocol are quite dif-
ficult to implement and requires special attention. Thus, integrating a security protocol
might require help from external libraries. Section 4.6.3 presented candidate technologies
of TLS implementations and evaluated each implementation according to the following
considerations:
1. Open Source library;
2. C/C++ Application Programming Interface (API) with proper documentation;
3. Implements the last version TLS 1.2;
4. Build automation tool with make;
5. Possibility of using callback functions;
As a result, GnuTLS is chosen over the others, mainly due to the fact that it has a good
API and good documentation, but also due to the fact that it gives the possibility of
using callbacks that might be used with event handlers in the DOORS framework. The
implementation of the newest version of TLS and the usage of the build automation tool
make are also relevant factors in this choice.
TLS is a client-server protocol to provide secure communications. Hence it needs a client
and a server to exchange information. For this implementation it was decided to provide
client support for the TLS protocol in the DOORS framework, expecting that during
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a communication the other peer is the server that supports TLS and provide server re-
sponses.
In terms of operation, TLS protocol operates over TCP. It is possible to provide a security
layer over UDP with Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS), but this protocol is out
of the scope of this thesis. The goal of this implementation is to provide a TLS protocol
operating over TCP for the most popular cases. The general idea is to give to the client the
ability of creating a secure communication using the most typical cases. The most typical
cases relies on RSA or Diffie-Hellman handshake sequences with server authentication
using certificates. Thus, the implementation should support X.509 certificates, and it
should be able to resume sessions as well.
Looking at the integration perspective, after considering several design ideas in the DOORS
framework architecture, it was decided to support the TLS functionality with the help of
GnuTLS. Since TLS is a complex client-server protocol, it was decided to create a DOORS
virtual device for TLS communications over TCP, and a TLS task to test the protocol.
The resultant design and implementation of this application should result in asynchronous
and message-based interactions between modules. However asynchronous communications
depends on the library functionalities, and some function calls might be blocking. For this
reason, the handshake, send and receive data calls might block and not give a full asyn-
chronous architecture. These matters will be discussed in the next sections.
For this implementation it was decided to give support to as many algorithms as possible,
giving more flexibility to the programmer. Considering the GnuTLS library, it was decided
to support the following algorithms and modes:
• Certificate types: X.509;
• Protocols: SSL3.0, TLS1.0, TLS1.1, TLS1.2;
• Ciphers: AES-256-CBC, AES-128-CBC, 3DES-CBC, DES-CBC, ARCFOUR-128,
ARCFOUR-40, RC2-40, CAMELLIA-256-CBC, CAMELLIA-128-CBC, NULL;
• MACs: SHA1, MD5, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, MD2, RIPEMD160, MAC-NULL;
• Key exchange algorithms: ANON-DH, RSA, RSA-EXPORT, DHE-RSA, DHE-
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DSS, SRP-DSS, SRP-RSA, SRP, PSK, DHE-PSK;
• Compression: DEFLATE, NULL;
• Public Key Systems: RSA, DSA;
• PK-signatures: RSA-SHA1, RSA-SHA256, RSA-SHA384, RSA-SHA512, RSA-
RMD160, DSA-SHA1, RSA-MD5, RSA-MD2.
5.2.2 Design Overview
This section explains the design prototyping for the TLS protocol in the DOORS frame-
work based on the considerations of section 5.2.1. It starts off with the background on
how this design came about, and in the next section it focuses in the details of the design
itself.
TLS is a protocol that resides between the transport layer and application layer. For
this reason it is important to create a module that can control the transport layer (i.e
sockets). Thus, the presented design is approached from creating a TLS device and a TLS
task to control the device. The TLS device and TLS task are the main creation of this
architecture and are illustrated in figure 5.9.
The TLS device called TlsConn is the object responsible to initialize the socket for TCP
communications, and is the one that makes use of the external library GnuTLS to take
care of the security matters. The TLS task called TlsTask is the object responsible to use
the functionalities of the device TlsConn and to give the behaviour of the TLS protocol
to other DOORS tasks.
The TlsTask is the lowest layer task in the architecture. It is located right below a con-
ceptual Application Protocol task in order to provide security to any application protocol
that might be developed (e.g. HTTP).
The hypothetical Application Protocol task might need to communicate with a LEMon
User task in order to provide testing of the protocol. The hypothetical exchanged messages
can be called App req and App ind.
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LEMon User
(EnvTask)
Application Layer
Task
SAP
FSM
peer
AppSAP::User usr
AppSAP::Provider up
TlsTask::User down
TlsTask
TlsTask::Provider up
App_req App_ind
Creq Cind
PDUs
FSM
TlsConn
Dtreq Dtind
DevIf::User down
Figure 5.9: Architecture overview of TLS support in DORRS
Any application protocol that needs to communicate with the TlsTask might exchange
the following messages:
• Creq: Connection request. An application protocol might send this message to the
TlsTask in order to request for a TLS connection;
• Dtreq: Data transfer request. An application protocol might send this message to
the TlsTask in order to send data, and depending on the protocol might wait for a
response;
• Cind: Connection indication. Is the response to a Creq. Gives positive answer
when a TCP connection and TLS handhshake are performed, and negative if some
problem occurred;
• Dtind: Data transfer indication. It returns data received from the device. Usually
is a response to a Dtreq.
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When the TlsTask receives a message from the upper layer (Application Protocol), the
TlsTask must use the TlsConn device to maintain the TLS connection.
To give behaviour to the TLS protocol, the TlsTask depends on a formal protocol speci-
fication: A Finite State Machine (FSM) that defines the task behaviour.
In terms of overall architecture in the DOORS environment, the tasks are controlled by
the Scheduler, and the I/O Handler is responsible to manage the devices required for the
communication.
5.2.3 Modular Interaction and Behaviour
Traditionally, when designing a module in a system, it is required to evaluate the protocol
to implement and use its specifications for the modulation itself. As explained in the
section 5.2.2 this implementation focus on the TlsConn device and the TlsTask. This
section explains the modulation of the two modules.
TlsConn
TlsConn is designed to be a device in the DOORS environment, and to be responsible
to control the transport layer in a TLS communication. For this matter, the table 5.1
describes different states of a TLS communication in two different perspectives: func-
tionalities from the device perspective, and functionalities from the external GnuTLS
library.
There are four main states. The first state is an Initialization state, where TlsConn should
initialize all the variables and parameters necessary to stablish a TLS connection. The
second state is called the Connect or Open state, where TlsConn first opens a socket with
a TCP connection and after establishes a TLS session. From here on, the handshake is
accomplished, and it is time to exchange data. The third state is called Data Transfer
state, where it is possible to write/send data and read/receive data. Finally, the fourth
state is called Close state, and is where the socket and TLS session are closed and other
variables are deinitialized.
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State Device GnuTLS
1) Init
Initialization of socket and
local variables.
Initialization of credentials,
certificates and other TLS
session parameters.
2) Open
Opens the socket and
establishes TCP connection.
Performs a TLS handshake /
Opens a TLS session.
3) Write
Reads data received from the
Task and writes it to a buffer.
Sends the buffer thru the
present session.
Read
Reads buffer and sends it to
the Task.
Reads data from the present
session and writes it to a
buffer.
4) Close
Close socket and
deinitialization of local
variables.
Close TLS session and
deinitialization of credentials,
certificates and other session
parameters.
Table 5.1: TlsConn states
TlsTask
Other module to implement is the TlsTask and it makes use of the TlsConn device.
TlsTask inherits from the DOORS PTask. The base of designing the TlsTask specifications
depends on a Finite State Machine (FSM), a state machine that defines the TLS protocol
behaviour. There are other protocol specifications that are hidden by the GnuTLS. Thus,
it is not required to design PDUs and message sequence diagrams, since these are already
used in the function calls of the library.
Closed Open
Dev::Open / Cind(ok)
Dreq(data) / dev.write(data)
dev.read(data) / Dtind(data)
Dev::Close / Cind(closed)
Creq(addr) / dev.connect(addr)
Figure 5.10: The state machine for the TlsTask
The state machine of the TlsTask consists of two states and is illustrated in figure 5.7.
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The initial state, “Closed”, is active when there is no TLS connection and the device is
ready to use. TlsTask waits for a Creq from the Application protocol, calls the device
to connect to the destination and waits for the device response. If the device connects
successfully to the peer, it must send a “open”message to the TlsTask, and TlsTask sends
a positive Cind message to the Application protocol and triggers the jump to the second
state “Open”.
While in this state “Open”, the TlsTask waits for data from the Application protocol or
from the device. If a Dreq is received from the Application protocol, then TlsTask must
call the device to write and send the data to the destination. If data is received from the
device, then TlsTask must send it in a Dtind message to the Application protocol.
Lastly, TlsTask returns to the first state when the device sends a “close”message to the
TlsTask. This operation might happen if, for some reason, the peer closed the connection
or if the TlsTask or device classes are destroyed.
5.2.4 Implementation
The TLS protocol design presented in figure 5.9 focuses on the implementation of a
TlsConn device and StunTask task modules to handle TLS connections. For this ap-
proach, the implementation can be divided in two parts. Firstly, the TlsConn device class
and secondly the TlsTask task which includes XML code and the TlsTask class itself.
TlsConn
The class TlsConn is the core of the DOORS virtual device implementation for TLS. It
makes use of the GnuTLS library and it is used to provide useful TLS functionalities to
the TlsTask. This means that TlsTask connects to another application by encapsulating
the functionalities provided by GnuTLS and TlsConn, as described in section 5.2.3. This
class is derived from class SocketConnectionAC and SockHelper which are provided in
DOORS.
As described in the section 5.2.3, TlsConn is designed to provide functionalities to dif-
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ferent states of TLS-based communications. The following paragraphs will give a brief
explanation of the most important public functions to be used.
The TlsConn class is included in Appendix B.3. Not all the functionalities provided by
TlsConn and GnuTLS are used since they might not all be needed. Firstly, the Initializa-
tion provides the instances of the DOORS I/O handler and the driver task to the device
instance.
class TlsConn : public SocketConnectionAC, public SockHelper {
public:
TlsConn (IoHandler *io, EventTask *t);
~TlsConn (void);
}
There are extra initializations that might be needed to a TLS connection. Depending
on the protocol and user’s demands, the following functions might be used. The extra
initialization functions are listed below.
bool tls_init_params(char *priority_list, int debug, int insecure, int
disable_ext);
bool tls_init_x509 (char *cafile, char *crlfile, char *keyfile, char *
certfile);
bool tls_init_srp (char *srpuser, char *srppass);
bool tls_init_psk (char *pskuser, char *pskkey);
tls init params() is used to initialize priority lists, debugging mode, insecure mode (to skip
some verifications) and extensions. The priority list refers to the cipher suite preferences,
and its initialization may contain some high level keyword that can be found at GnuTLS
documentation [61]. tls init x509() might be used to initialize parameters required for
X.509 certification, and might indicate the path of the following files: Certification Au-
thority List, Certificate Revocation List, Private Key and Client Certificate. If the pointer
is set to NULL to any of the arguments, the device assumes that the file does not exist. The
function tls init srp() is used to initialize username and password for the SRP protocol,
and tls init psk() for the PSK protocol.
The connect functions listed below are used in the Open state, where the device actually
establishes a TLS connection with another application:
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bool connect (Address *a);
bool connect (Address *a, Frame sessiondata);
The first connect() is used to connect to a specified address for the first time, meaning
that the device establishes a session for the first time. The second connect() call might be
used to connect to a specific address using Session Resuming capability, meaning that it
resumes a session established before.
The third state is the Data Transfer state, where actually the device is already connected
to a peer. The functions are listed bellow.
virtual int getFd (void) const;
Frame getSession (void);
void callbackWrite (void);
void callbackRead (void);
When a TLS connection is established with a peer, the connection file descriptor is stored
and set to read mode. This means that when the I/O handler runs, it checks all the devices
that are read enabled, and retrieves the associated file descriptor for them. getFd() is a
simple function call that retrieves the file descriptor. When the read mode is enabled,
some data is available to be read for this device, the I/O handler calls the callbackRead()
and it saves the data in a buffer and sends it to the TlsTask. When the write mode is
enabled, there is some data to be sent and the I/O handler calls the callbackWrite() to
send the data to the destination. Lastly, getSession() saves the current session data in a
Frame. This function call might be used to store the session data, and can be used later
for Session Resuming.
The last state is the Close state. The function is listed below.
virtual bool close (void);
This virtual call close() is actually called when the device disconnects from the peer. For
some reason some error might have occurred and the peer might have disconnected or
the TlsTask might want to close the connection. This function call takes care of the file
descriptors and deinitializes all the variables and settings set previously.
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There are more functions in the TlsConn class, but they are less significant for the TlsTask
to work properly. Many of them are public and other private, but all are used to internally
manage the device and the GnuTLS library.
TlsTask
The TlsTask is the main task of this implementation. The job of this task is to use TlsConn
device functions and give the main behaviour to the TLS protocol.
The implementation of TlsTask depends on two important XML specifications: A Finite
State Machine (FSM) and a Service Access Point (SAP). Based on the diagram illustrated
and explained in subsection 5.2.3, it was possible to create the XML specifications to be
supplied to the Code generator and transform it into C++ classes. The state machine was
implemented using the dsmg tool and its XML specification is included in Appendix B.1.1.
The SAP was implemented using the dsapg tool and its XML specification is included in
Appendix B.1.2.
TlsTask inherits from PTask and it communicates with the Application Protocol Task
from the SAP port, as shown in figure 5.9 and its class is included in Appendix B.2.
5.3 Development Environment
This section describes related components, tools and systems which were used to imple-
ment the designed prototypes explained in the sections above. The work was done mostly
under C/C++ programming language in the Linux environment. Also several tools were
used for project management, testing and debugging.
Both STUN protocol and TLS protocol were developed and tested in the GNU/Linux
operating system. In this case Fedora Core 12 distribution was used over the kernel
version 2.6.32.26-175. The tools used for STUN and TLS implementation are listed in
table 5.2. The external libraries are listed in table 5.3.
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Protocol Name Version Description
Gedit 2.28.3 Gnome editor
STUN GCC 4.4.4 GNU Compiler Collection
and GNU Make 3.81 Generation of executables
TLS GNU DDD 3.3.12 Data Display Debugger
Wireshark 1.2.11 Network protocol analyser
STUN reTurnServer 0.4 STUN/TURN Server component of the reSIProcate projects
TLS Certtool 2.10.2 GnuTLS tool to generate X.509 certificates
ssldump 0.9b3 SSLv3/TLS network protocol analyzer
Table 5.2: Tools used for Implementation
Protocol Name Version Description
STUN and TLS DOORS 0.6 DOORS framework
TLS
GnuTLS 2.10.2 GNU Transport Layer Security Library
Libgcrypt 1.4.6 GNU’s library of cryptographic building blocks
Libtasn1 2.8 ASN.1 library
Zlib 1.2.5 Compression/Decompression library
libc 2.11.2 GNU C library
libstdc++ 6.0.13 GNU Standard C++ Library v3
Table 5.3: Libraries used for Implementation
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Chapter 6
Implementation Testing and
Analysis
Testing is the process of trying to find errors in the system implementations by means of
experimentation. This experimentation is carried out in a special environment in order
to simulate normal and exceptional procedures of the protocols. The aim of testing is to
gain confidence and make sure that the system works satisfactorily during the normal and
exceptional procedures. In other hand, testing only shows the presence of errors, not their
absence, so it is not possible to ensure complete correctness. In this case, a successful test
of the implementations means that the protocol is working correctly for the most typical
cases, and is almost ready to fully integrate in the DOORS framework. Almost ready to
integrate means that the implementation works satisfactorily in the framework, and can
be fully integrated as soon as a specialist validates the feasibility of its usage. In the next
sections some test cases for each implementation are presented. Corresponding test results
will be presented based on the performance of the various tested modules.
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6.1 Test Network
This section presents the topology of the network used for the testing of the protocols.
The testing of the protocols were performed in the TLT network at the Department of
Communications Engineering at Tampere University of Technology (TUT). Figure 6.1
illustrates the principal layout of the network used.
Firewall
(omo-gw)
Switch
(product-gw)
Router
(surf-gw)TLT
Internet 
(Funet)
NAT Router
(my-router)
192.168.1.1
130.230.52.180
Virtual Server
(stun.rd.tut.fi)
130.230.141.165
Client
192.168.1.2
Google Mail
(mail.google.com)
209.85.149.17
GnuTLS Test
(test.gnutls.org)
207.192.75.61
Figure 6.1: Test Network
The computer used as a client in the whole testing process is the same used for developing
the protocol: a HP COMPAQ Pentium 4 running the linux distribution Fedora Core 12.
The computer is connected to an Asus WL-500W router with NAT enabled, and has the IP
address 192.168.1.2. The router is connected to the TLT network and has the static public
IP 130.230.52.180. For the client to contact the Server, it has to pass thru the product-gw
switch, the omo-gw firewall and the router surf-gw. The Virtual Server stun.rd.tut.fi with
the public IP address 130.230.141.165 is a Ubuntu virtual machine connected to a router
still inside TUT network. Other possible Servers such as Google Mail Server and GnuTLS
Test Server are available on Internet and are used for testing as well.
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6.2 STUN Analysis
This section presents the testing of the STUN protocol. Firstly, a general test case is de-
scribed and then there are some important details of the results that validate the proposed
test case.
6.2.1 Test Case
Considering the network of the section 6.1, the STUN client was tested in the TLT network
and was connected with a router with NAT enabled. The STUN client gets the private
IP address 192.168.1.2 via DHCP. The STUN server is a Virtual Server (stun.rd.tut.fi),
a reTurnServer listening in the UDP port 3478 [62]. The test case is illustrated in figure
6.2.
LEMon User StunTask UdpTask
device
STUN Client
192.168.1.2
STUN Server
stun.rd.tut.fi
STUN Request
STUN Response
Addr_req
Dtreq
Addr_ind
Dtind
Figure 6.2: Test STUN
Considering the implementation of the protocol in section 5.1, the Client must use a
LEMon user task to communicate with the STUN task. The client must send a Addr req
90 CHAPTER 6. IMPLEMENTATION TESTING AND ANALYSIS
to the STUN task and should wait for a Addr ind response.
When testing a protocol some problems can occur. The encoding of the PDUs and other
network errors are some examples of problems that might occur. This test case is validated
if the Addr ind response is received properly without any errors.
6.2.2 Results
This section presents the results and their validation for the test cases of the previous
section. Firstly the output of the LEMon User and the content of the received messages
will be presented. The results from the network were captured using the well known
Wireshark, a network protocol analyzer.
***** stun BEFORE run 19:33:20.015148
*** Message from env:usr to stun:up ***
Message ’addr_req’ = {
Frame data = request
}
***** env BEFORE run 19:33:20.017114
*** Message from stun:up to env:usr ***
Message ’addr4_ind’ = {
InetAddr req_addr = 130.230.52.180:39950
}
Figure 6.3: A partial capture of the LEMon User output during the STUN test
Figure 6.4: A partial screen capture of Wireshark, during the STUN test
192.168.1.2 130.230.141.165
| |
| Binding Request |
|(39950) -------------------> (3478) |
| Binding Success Resp |
|(39950) <------------------- (3478) |
Figure 6.5: Graph Analysis of Wireshark, during the STUN test
During the STUN test it was possible to get the following results: Figure 6.3 illustrates a
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partial capture of the LEMon user output; Figure 6.4 illustrates a partial screen capture of
the network analyser Wireshark, detailing the messages sent by the agents and captured
by the device; Figure 6.5 illustrates a graph analysis generated by Wireshark.
The Client sends an Addr req and receives a successful Addr ind. From figure 6.3 it is pos-
sible to verify the behaviour of the implementation, checking that the message Addr4 ind
contains the reflexive address for the STUN client:
• Public IP Address: 130.230.52.180
• Public Port: 39950
From figure 6.4 and figure 6.5 it is possible to analyse the packets and validate the protocol,
since Wireshark automatically recognizes the protocol as STUN2 and in the Information
column it gives the type of the STUN message.
Comparing figure 6.3 and figure 6.4 it is possible to conclude that when the client sends a
UDP message, the NAT router uses the same source port 39950 (if available), and changes
the source IP to its public address 130.230.52.180 to transmit the packet.
6.3 TLS Testing
This section presents the testing of the TLS protocol. Firstly a general test case is de-
scribed and then some important details of the results that validates the test case are
proposed.
6.3.1 Test Case
First of all, testing the TLS protocol involves the choice of an Application protocol to
combine with security. In this test case, a HTTPS test case is provided, which is a
combination of the HTTP protocol with the SSL/TLS protocol.
Looking at the design perspective, figure 6.6 illustrates the simple test case chosen to test
HTTPS.
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TlsSAP::User usr
TlsTask
SAPTlsTask::Provider up
Dtreq
Cind
FSM
TlsConn
Dtind
Creq
DevIf::User down
Figure 6.6: Test TLS model
Since HTTP is a simple request/response protocol with simple PDUs that only sends
string commands to the server, it was decided to skip the implementation of a HTTP
task, and simply leave the LEMon User to communicate straight with the TlsTask. Using
this structure, the LEMon user only needs to use the TlsTask SAP to send SDUs. It only
needs to connect to the Server and send string commands. Figure 6.7 illustrates a message
sequence diagram of the TLS test case.
Considering the network architecture of the figure 6.1, the TLS client is tested in the TLT
network and is connected to a router with NAT enabled. The TLS client gets the private
IP address 192.168.1.2 via DHCP. It is quite important to note that the usage of the
HTTP protocol in the TLT network is quite vulnerable, either because the client is in a
private LAN, and also because of the TLT network where there are many other computers
connected. If there is the necessity of sending sensitive information, the packets can be
captured by a eavesdropper, and secrets can be discovered. Man-in-the-middle attacks
are other often common attacks, where an attacker fools both parties of a communication.
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Figure 6.7: Test HTTP over TLS
Thus it is decided to test the HTTPS protocol and the chosen HTTPS test server is the
Google Mail Server (mail.google.com) listening in the TCP port 443.
Considering the message sequence diagram of figure 6.7, the Client must use the LEMon
user task to communicate with the TlsTask. First it sends a Creq to connect to the
server and waits for the confirmation Cind. When the TLS connection is established it
sends a Dtreq message to send a GET command to the Server. In the HTTP protocol,
a GET command requests a representation of the specified resource. If everything goes
well the Server might send a response and the LEMon user receives it back in the message
Dtind.
When testing a protocol some problems can occur. Connection problems, not accepted
ciphers, error in the validation of certificates, and network errors are some examples of
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problems that might occur. This test case is validated if the Client successfully connects
to the Server, and if it is able to send and receive responses without any errors.
6.3.2 Results
This section presents the results and its validation for the test cases of the previous section.
At first it presents the output of the LEMon User and the content of the received messages.
Then, it presents the results captured from the Network using ssldump, a SSLv3/TLS
network protocol analyzer.
During the TLS test it was possible to get the following results: Figure 6.8 illustrates a
partial capture of a Connection Request in the LEMon user; Figure 6.9 illustrates a partial
capture for a Dtreq and Dtind in the LEMon user; Figure 6.10 illustrates the output of
the network analyser ssldump, detailing the messages sent by the agents and captured by
the device.
***** tls BEFORE run 21:28:24.477376
*** Message from env:usr to tls:up ***
Message ’creq’ = {
Frame priorities = SECURE256
Frame cafile = certificates/x509-trust.pem
}
***** env BEFORE run 21:28:25.115928
*** Message from tls:up to env:usr ***
Message ’cind’ = {
InetAddr addr = 209.85.149.83:443
Frame message = TLS Connected!
}
Figure 6.8: A partial capture of a Connection Request in the LEMon user during the TLS
test
From the DOORS perspective, the LEMon User sends a Creq and receives a successful
Cind. From figure 6.8 it is possible to validate the connection request and connection indi-
cation, meaning that the TLS Session/Connection was successfully established. From that
on, the application data transfer starts with a Dtreq, when the client runs the command
“GET / HTTP/1.0”and receives two Dtind messages. From figure 6.9 it is possible to
validate the application data transferred during the TLS session, meaning that the Server
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***** tls BEFORE run 21:28:31.295547
*** Message from env:usr to tls:up ***
Message ’dtreq’ = {
Frame data = GET / HTTP/1.0
}
***** env BEFORE run 21:28:31.329310
*** Message from tls:up to env:usr ***
Message ’dtind’ = {
InetAddr source = 209.85.149.83:443
Frame data = HTTP/1.0 302 Found
Location: https://encrypted.google.com/
Cache-Control: private
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Set-Cookie: PREF=ID=4d6097fcb0aa379a:FF=0:TM=1311008591:LM
=1311008591:S=bdGrjSR1Rh2r1TZM; expires=Wed, 17-Jul-2013
17:03:11 GMT; path=/; domain=.google.com
Date: Mon, 18 Jul 2011 17:03:11 GMT
Server: gws
Content-Length: 226
X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
}
***** env BEFORE run 21:28:31.336593
*** Message from tls:up to env:usr ***
Message ’dtind’ = {
InetAddr source = 209.85.149.83:443
Frame data =
<HTML><HEAD><meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html;
charset=utf-8">
<TITLE>302 Moved</TITLE></HEAD><BODY>
<H1>302 Moved</H1>
The document has moved
<A HREF="https://encrypted.google.com/">here</A>.
</BODY></HTML>
}
Figure 6.9: A partial capture of a Dtreq and Dtind in the LEMon user during the TLS
test
receives the requests and answers accordingly to the protocol, and the device successfully
decodes the messages to plaintext.
From figure 6.10 it is possible to analyse the packets and validate the protocol, since
ssldump automatically recognizes the SSLv3/TLS protocol and recognizes the type of
each message. From this output is also possible to recognize the new tcp connection, the
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New TCP connection #1: pedro.tut(65000) <-> mail.google.com(443)
1 1 0.1374 (0.1374) C>S Handshake ClientHello
1 2 0.1676 (0.0302) S>C Handshake ServerHello
1 3 0.1677 (0.0000) S>C Handshake Certificate
1 4 0.1677 (0.0000) S>C Handshake ServerHelloDone
1 5 0.3504 (0.1826) C>S Handshake ClientKeyExchange
1 6 0.4195 (0.0691) C>S ChangeCipherSpec
1 7 0.4195 (0.0000) C>S Handshake
1 8 0.4489 (0.0293) S>C ChangeCipherSpec
1 9 0.4489 (0.0000) S>C Handshake
1 10 6.8182 (6.3693) C>S application_data
1 11 6.8495 (0.0313) S>C application_data
1 12 6.8495 (0.0000) S>C application_data
1 6.8496 (0.0001) S>C TCP FIN
1 13 6.8530 (0.0034) C>S Alert
1 6.8531 (0.0000) C>S TCP FIN
Figure 6.10: Messages sent by the agents and captured by ssldump during the TLS test
successful handshake, the application data transfer, and the connection closing.
Even though it is not shown in the outputs, the TLS handshake is performed with the
following parameters:
• Key Exchange: RSA
• Protocol: TLS1.0
• Certificate Type: X.509
• Compression: NULL
• Cipher: ARCFOUR-128
• MAC: SHA1
The application data transfer is encrypted with ARCFOUR-128 and cannot be understood
by an eavesdropper that might attack the network. Using TLS with PKI and certificates,
and the data transfer fully encrypted with a symmetric algorithm and MAC, it is provided
a true sense of security with authentication, confidentiality and integrity.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
The current chapter discusses the thesis’ conclusions based on previous chapters. Section
7.1 is a small synthesis where the main contents of each chapter are highlighted and section
7.2 summarizes the main conclusions. Section 7.3 enumerates a few topics to address in
future investigation.
7.1 Synthesis
This section briefly describes each chapter’s content.
Chapter 1 explains that the scope of this thesis is the investigation and integration of the
STUN and TLS protocols in the DOORS framework environment. It also highlights their
architecture and functionalities for their usage and further developments.
Chapter 2 describes the DOORS framework architecture and its usage. Moreover, it
presents the general system functionalities that are used in the following chapters.
Chapter 3 overviews the NAT traversal problem and the STUN protocol as a tool to
improve protocols in penetrating the NAT. This is an important chapter because it explains
the importance of NAT traversal and gives some important information of the STUN
specifications used for the further chapters.
Network security is discussed in Chapter 4. Here, it is discussed relevant aspects of the
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usage of security in different layers on the TCP/IP stack, and important services to provide
when securing a network. Further, it provides the importance of cryptography and some
algorithms and methods to provide different services in network security. Finally the TLS
protocol is described as a final solution to secure the transport layer, merging all the
algorithms and methods discussed previously.
Chapter 5 describes the protocols’ implementation. STUN and TLS protocols integration
in the DOORS framework is the aim, illustrating important diagrams for its design and
many other specifications for its final usage.
Chapter 6 validates the protocols’ functionality. It discusses the validity of the STUN and
TLS protocol in the DOORS framework presenting their usage with some outputs and
network flows and compares the obtained results with the theoretical specifications.
7.2 Conclusions
The main objective of this thesis is focused on the study and integration of two different
protocols for the DOORS framework.
The importance of NATs is a crucial theme to some protocols that might not work properly.
DOORS as a framework for implementing protocols and network applications was not
prepared for this problematic. New protocols or applications developed in the DOORS
framework might be working behind a NAT, and the necessity of a NAT traversal solution
might be useful. For this purpose, a design for the STUN protocol was proposed in the
DOORS framework, to be used by developers as a tool to help in NAT traversal. Using this
implementation, it is possible to enable applications to communicate with the StunTask
presented in the section 5.1 to discover their reflexive address. It is proved with section
6.2 that the presented design is feasible in the DOORS framework and we can ensure that
any application protocol can use StunTask to help NAT traversal solutions. With this
design it is possible to prove the idea of loosely de-coupled objects that handle incoming
events and communicate with other objects using messages. This section also tested an
application sending messages to the StunTask, and receiving responses accordingly to the
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protocol specifications and the DOORS requirements. Since NAT traversal only makes
sense for IPv4, the STUN solution only works for IPv4 addresses, but in the future IPv6
can be easily integrated.
The importance of security is a crucial theme for most of the protocols exchanging messages
in an insecure channel. New protocols or applications developed in the DOORS frame-
work might need to provide an extra layer of security. The goal is to provide security to
application protocols at the transport layer in the DOORS framework, encapsulating the
protocol through an encrypted SSL/TLS connection. For this purpose, it was proposed
the integration of the TLS protocol in DOORS framework with the help of the GnuTLS
library, and its design is presented on section 5.2. The solution for this protocol goes to
a lower level architecture and focuses on an implementation of two objects, a TLS device
and a TLS task. It is proved with section 6.3 that the presented design is feasible in the
DOORS framework and we can ensure that any application protocol can use TlsTask to
begin a secure communication in the transport layer. With this design we proved that
it is possible to use external libraries to integrate new protocols in the DOORS frame-
work. Using a virtual device for the external communication and the usage of the TlsTask
to control the device was definitely an effective solution. To prove the funcionality of
this architecture it was decided to simulate the HTTPS protocol. The application layer
protocol HTTP communicates successfully with the TlsTask, and a TLS connection is
established providing a security layer to the HTTP protocol. After the successfull hand-
shake, the application protocol sent a GET command, and received responses accordingly
to the protocol specifications. This implementation supports IPv4 and IPv6 addresses.
In terms of DOORS requirements, the GnuTLS library uses some blocking calls causing
some synchronization problems to DOORS. However, if a full asynchronous environment
is not necessary, it works perfectly.
7.3 Future Work
During the development of the proposed solutions, some assumptions were made to support
our architecture models.
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Firstly for the case of the STUN protocol, it was decided to support UDP for the most
typical cases using IPv4 addresses. In the future this model can be extended for TCP
connections and IPv6 addresses. More testing and performance evaluation is needed to
ascertain that it is feasible and beneficial in practice.
Further work in the TLS integration can be conducted to improve the asynchronism of the
architecture. GnuTLS function calls such as gnutls handshake(), gnutls record send() and
gnutls record recv() are blocking calls that do not allow a full asynchronous architecture
in the DOORS framework. The goal must be to use callback functions instead and give a
full asynchronous architecture to fully integrate the DOORS requirements.
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Appendixes to the STUN
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A.1 XML Specifications
A.1.1 Peer/PDU Specifications
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<Peer Name="StunPeer" HIncludeFiles="stunheader.h, doors/inetaddr.h"
IIncludeFiles="stunpdu.h">
<Message Name="REQUEST">
<Parent>STUNHeader</Parent>
<Field> Uint16 type </Field>
<Field> Uint16 length </Field>
<Field> Frame software </Field>
<Field> InetAddr addr </Field>
</Message>
<Message Name="SUCCESSRESPONSE">
<Parent>STUNHeader</Parent>
<Field> Uint16 type </Field>
<Field> Uint16 length </Field>
<Field> Uint8 reserved </Field>
<Field> Uint8 family </Field>
<Field> Uint16 xport </Field>
<Field> Uint32 xaddress4 </Field>
<Field> Frame xaddress</Field>
101
102 APPENDIX A. APPENDIXES TO THE STUN IMPLEMENTATION
<Field> InetAddr srcIP </Field>
<Field> InetAddr destIP </Field>
</Message>
<Message Name="ERRORRESPONSE">
<Parent>STUNHeader</Parent>
<Field> Uint16 type </Field>
<Field> Uint16 length </Field>
<Field> Uint16 reserved </Field>
<Field> Uint8 reserved_class </Field>
<Field> Uint8 number </Field>
<Field> Frame reason_phrase</Field>
<!-- new attribute -->
<Field> Frame unknown_attr </Field>
<Field> InetAddr srcIP </Field>
<Field> InetAddr destIP </Field>
</Message>
</Peer>
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A.1.2 State Machine Specifications
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<SM Name="StunTaskSM" PTask="StunTask" CIncludeFiles="stunsm.h, stuntask.h
, stunsap.h, stunpdu.h">
<SAP-File Name="stunsap.sap"/>
<Peer-File Name="stunpdu.pdu"/>
<From StunSAP="up"/>
<From StunPeer="peer"/>
<State Name="Idle" Default="idle_Default">
<Interface Name="up">
<Input Name="Addr_req">idle_Addr_req</Input>
</Interface>
</State>
<State Name="Wait" Default="wait_Default">
<Interface Name="peer">
<Input Name="SUCCESSRESPONSE">wait_SUCCESSRESPONSE</Input>
</Interface>
<Interface Name="peer">
<Input Name="ERRORRESPONSE">wait_ERRORRESPONSE</Input>
</Interface>
<Timer>wait_Timeout</Timer>
</State>
</SM>
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A.1.3 Service Access Point Specifications
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<SAP Name="StunSAP" CIncludeFiles="stunsap.h">
<User>
<Message Name="Addr_req">
<Field>Frame data</Field>
</Message>
</User>
<Provider>
<Message Name="Addr4_ind">
<Field>InetAddr req_addr</Field>
</Message>
<Message Name="Error_ind">
<Field>Frame data</Field>
</Message>
</Provider>
</SAP>
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A.2 StunTask Class Code
#ifndef STUNTASK_H
#define STUNTASK_H
#include <string>
#include <doors/ptb.h>
#include <doors/udp.h>
#include <doors/ptask.h>
#include <doors/inetaddr.h>
#include <doors/timer.h>
#include "stunsap.h"
#include "stunsm.h"
#include "stunpdu.h"
#include "stunheader.h"
#include "stundef.h"
#define MAX_RETRIES 5
class StunTaskSM;
class StunTask : public PTask {
public:
StunTask (std::string name, Scheduler* s, StunTaskSM* sm, InetAddr addr
);
virtual ~StunTask();
UdpSAP :: User down; // SAP to UDP task
StunSAP :: Provider up; // SAP to a user task
StunPeer peer; // SAP to Stun peer
// Idle state
bool idle_Default (Message* msg);
bool idle_Addr_req (Message* msg);
// Wait state
bool wait_Default (Message* msg);
bool wait_SUCCESSRESPONSE (Message* msg);
bool wait_ERRORRESPONSE (Message* msg);
bool wait_Timeout (Message* msg);
// Helper functions
private:
void sendRequest ();
void retransmitRequest ();
void receiveSuccessResponse (Message* msg);
void receiveErrorResponse (Message* msg);
106 APPENDIX A. APPENDIXES TO THE STUN IMPLEMENTATION
bool is_valid_header (STUNHeader header);
// Class variables
InetAddr destaddr_; //destination addr structure (contain just the
value, but we don’t use yet)
Timer timer_; //timer
Uint16 retries_; //retries
TidStruct tid_; //transaction_id sent in the REQUEST
StunPeer :: REQUEST *buffer_msg; //message sent in the REQUEST
};
#endif
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B.1 XML Specifications
B.1.1 State Machine Specifications
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<SM Name="TlsTaskSM" PTask="TlsTask" CIncludeFiles="tlssm.h, tlstask.h,
tlssap.h">
<SAP-File Name="tlssap.sap"/>
<From TlsSAP="up"/>
<From DevIf="down"/>
<State Name="closed" Default="closed_Default">
<Interface Name="up">
<Input Name="creq">closed_Creq</Input>
</Interface>
<Interface Name="down">
<Input Name="open">closed_Conn</Input>
</Interface>
</State>
<State Name="open" Default="open_Default">
<Interface Name="up">
<Input Name="dtreq">open_Dtreq</Input>
</Interface>
<Interface Name="down">
<Input Name="read">open_Data</Input>
<Input Name="close">open_Disconn</Input>
</Interface>
</State>
</SM>
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B.1.2 Service Access Point Specifications
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<SAP Name="TlsSAP" CIncludeFiles="tlssap.h">
<User>
<Message Name="Creq">
<Field>Frame priorities</Field>
<Field>Frame cafile</Field>
</Message>
<Message Name="Dtreq">
<Field>Frame data</Field>
</Message>
</User>
<Provider>
<Message Name="Cind">
<Field>InetAddr addr</Field>
<Field>Frame message</Field>
</Message>
<Message Name="Dtind">
<Field>InetAddr source</Field>
<Field>Frame data</Field>
</Message>
</Provider>
</SAP>
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B.2 TlsTask Class Code
#ifndef TLSTASK_H
#define TLSTASK_H
#include <string>
#include <doors/ptb.h>
#include <doors/devif.h>
#include <doors/inetaddr.h>
#include <map>
#include "tlsconn.h"
#include "tlssap.h"
#include "tlssm.h"
class TlsTask : public PTask {
public:
TlsTask (std::string n, Scheduler *s, IoHandler *io, Address *a1,
TlsTaskSM* sm);
~TlsTask (void);
TlsSAP :: Provider up;
DevIf :: User down;
bool closed_Default (Message* msg);
bool closed_Creq (Message* msg);
bool closed_Conn (Message* msg);
bool open_Default (Message* msg);
bool open_Dtreq (Message* msg);
bool open_Data (Message* msg);
bool open_Disconn (Message* msg);
Frame session_data;
int resume;
protected:
TlsConn tlsdevice;
InetAddr rem_addr; //remote address
Address *addr_; //same as rem_addr
};
#endif // TLSTASK_H
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B.3 TlsConn Class Code
//tlsconn.h
#ifndef TLSCONN_H
#define TLSCONN_H
#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
# include <config.h>
#endif
#include <doors/hsi.h>
#include <doors/soconnac.h>
#include <doors/buffer.h>
#include <doors/sockhelper.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
#include <gnutls/extra.h>
#include <gnutls/x509.h>
#define MAX_BUF 4096
/** TlsConn can be seen as a client that tries to
connect into SockEnt. When connection is established
another TlsConn instance is also created into the
peer entity and the actual data transfer is done between
these two instances. The device informs different event to the
controlling task by sending message with proper parameters.
TlsConn is read-write device. */
class TlsConn : public SocketConnectionAC, public SockHelper {
public:
/** Initializes the base class and own variables. This constructor is
used when instance is created without actually connecting to
the peer entity. It can be done later with connect function call.
@param io I/O handler of the system
@param t the task that holds the device*/
TlsConn (IoHandler *io, EventTask *t);
/** Initializes the base class and own variables. Constructor is
used when instance is created with given file decriptor. This
usually happens in server side where descriptor is created by
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SocketEntity.
@param ioh the i/o handler of the system.
@param t the task that holds the device
@param sd is descriptor for connection to be
communicate with peer entity. */
//TlsConn (IoHandler *io, EventTask *t, Uint32 sd);
/** Initializes the base class and own variables. Constructor is
used when instance is created with given peer entity address.
This usually happens in client side where connection is established
by the instance itself.
@param ioh the i/o handler of the system,
@param t the task that holds the device
@param a an address of the peer entity. */
//TlsConn (IoHandler *io, EventTask *t, Address *a);
/**Delete connector and stream instances. */
~TlsConn (void);
/** Function is used for connecting to peer entity. The type of
connection is checked from the type of address and proper
connector and stream is created.
The controlling task is informed both the success of failure
of the connection establishement through the DevIf.
@param a The address of peer entity.*/
bool connect (Address *a);
/** Function is used for connecting to peer entity with a
previous TLS Session. The type of connection is checked
from the type of address and proper connector and stream
is created. The controlling task is informed both the success
of failure of the connection establishement through the DevIf.
@param a The address of peer entity.
@param a The Session data of a previous TLS Session.*/
bool connect (Address *a, Frame sessiondata);
/** Function is used for connecting to peer entity. The type of
connection is checked from the type of file descriptor and
proper stream is created.
@param sd The filedescriptor of peer entity */
bool connect (Uint32 sd);
/**Close device and send proper message to the
controlling task. */
virtual bool close (void);
/** @return File descriptor of this connection */
virtual int getFd (void) const;
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/** Function is runned when something is to be writen into the
socket. <p>
If it is possible to write all data into the socket it is done without
any breaks. If it is not possible then writing is done only partially
and it is continued when data can be sended.<p>
If for some reason error happens then controlling task is informed
with DevIf :: Close message. */
void callbackWrite (void);
/** Function is runned when something is to be read from the
socket. <p>
If there is all data availeble then it is read without any breaks
and SocketData message is send to the controlling task. If there
is not enough data availeble then partial reading is used and reading
is continued when there is new data availeble.
The data is sent in DevIF :: Read message to the task when either
packetlenght is zero or wsize is set for -1 (StreamDevice :: immediate
).
wsize is set to zero after data is sent and it must be set with
devices readBytes function before every reading for the
sake of synchronising. <p>
If for some reason error happens then controlling task is informed
with DevIf :: Close message. */
void callbackRead (void);
/** Function wraps the system call getpeername.
@return the address of the peer entity. */
Address *getRemoteAddress (void);
/** Function wraps the gnutls_session_t.
@return the actual session */
Frame getSession (void);
bool setSession (Frame sessiondata);
bool tls_init_params(char *priority_list, int debug, int insecure, int
disable_ext);
bool tls_init_x509 (char *cafile, char *crlfile, char *keyfile, char *
certfile);
bool tls_init_srp (char *srpuser, char *srppass);
bool tls_init_psk (char *pskuser, char *pskkey);
protected:
int bindPort(int sock, int addrType);
int get_portnumber(int s);
void reset_global_var (void);
bool tls_global_init (void);
void tls_global_deinit (void);
bool tls_init_session (void);
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bool tls_handshake (void);
static int cert_verify_callback (gnutls_session_t session);
static int srp_username_callback (gnutls_session_t session, char **
username, char **password);
static int psk_callback (gnutls_session_t session, char **username,
gnutls_datum_t * key);
int print_info (gnutls_session_t session);
void print_x509_certificate_info (gnutls_session_t session);
void print_cert_vrfy (gnutls_session_t session);
void check_alert (gnutls_session_t session, int ret);
static void tls_log_func (int level, const char *str);
static const char *bin2hex (const void *bin, size_t bin_size);
/* GNUTLS stuff here */
const char *hostname; //hostname of the peer (server)
//int verbose; //verbose mode != 0
int debug; //debug > 0; if debug == 0 then no_debug_verbose
int insecure; //if insecure != 0 -> protocol insecure -> skip
verifications
int disable_extensions; //only extension until now -> GNUTLS_NAME_DNS
int resume; //if resumed session
bool flag_x509; //true if X.509 auth is used
bool flag_anon; //true if auth is anonimous (DH)
bool flag_psk; //true if PSK auth is used
bool flag_srp; //true if SRP auth is used
char *x509_cafile; //path of the CAs trusted file
char *x509_crlfile; //PKI -> path of the CRL file
//not in use yet
char *x509_keyfile; //path of the Private Key File
char *x509_certfile; //path of the Certificate File
gnutls_x509_crt_fmt_t x509ctype;
char *psk_username;
gnutls_datum_t psk_key;
char *srp_passwd;
char *srp_username;
char *priorities; //priorities list
gnutls_session_t session; //session data
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gnutls_certificate_credentials_t xcred; //X.509 credentials
gnutls_anon_client_credentials_t anon_cred; //Anon DH credentials
gnutls_srp_client_credentials_t srp_cred; //SRP credentials
gnutls_psk_client_credentials_t psk_cred; //PSK credentials
static TlsConn *myclass;
/*
//->To Use Client Authentication with certificate
#define MAX_CRT 6
unsigned int x509_crt_size;
gnutls_x509_crt_t x509_crt[MAX_CRT];
gnutls_x509_privkey_t x509_key;
*/
/*
//->To Use Client Authentication with certificate
static int cert_callback (gnutls_session_t session, const gnutls_datum_t
* req_ca_rdn, int nreqs,
const gnutls_pk_algorithm_t * sign_algos, int sign_algos_length,
gnutls_retr_st * st);
static void load_keys (void);
static gnutls_datum_t load_file (const char *file);
static void unload_file (gnutls_datum_t data);
*/
/*
static int protocol_priority[PRI_MAX];
static int kx_priority[PRI_MAX];
static int cipher_priority[PRI_MAX];
static int comp_priority[PRI_MAX];
static int mac_priority[PRI_MAX];
static int cert_type_priority[PRI_MAX];
*/
};
#endif
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